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Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs
Law in the Roberts Court
Harlan Grant Cohen*
ABSTRACT
When it comes to foreign relations, the Roberts Court has trust issues. As
far as the Court is concerned, everyone—the President, Congress, the lower
courts, plaintiffs—has played hard and fast with the rules, taking advantage of
the Court’s functionalist approaches to foreign affairs issues. This seems to be
the message of the Roberts Court foreign affairs law jurisprudence.
The Roberts Court has been active in foreign affairs law, deciding cases
on the detention and trial of enemy combatants, foreign sovereign immunity,
the domestic effect of treaties, the extraterritorial reach of federal statutes, the
preemption of state laws, and the scope of the political question doctrine,
among others. Looking back at those decisions, this Article notes and explores a stark and surprising trend. Across a string of decisions, from
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld through Medellı́n v. Texas, Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., and Bond v. United States, the Court has jettisoned its
traditional foreign affairs functionalism in favor of formalism.
The shift, as the Article explains, is not merely rhetorical or stylistic. Embedded within these opinions is a deep distrust of the executive branch, Congress, and the courts. And embraced by a surprising number of Justices
across different wings of the Court, this formalism of distrust has brought
about constraints on the discretion of the federal government that are deeper
and more powerful than have been seen in some time. Foreign affairs formalism, with all of its implications, is the new reality—one that must be understood and watched.
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INTRODUCTION
The Solicitor General was having a rough time. Arguing on behalf of the federal government and defending Carol Anne Bond’s conviction under the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation
Act1 for the attempted poisoning of her neighbor, U.S. Solicitor General Donald Verrilli entreated the Justices of the Supreme Court to
tread lightly in construing the scope of the Act and the treaty it implemented. The language of the Chemical Weapons Convention was the
topic of ongoing “very sensitive negotiations”2 with Syria and Iran,
and a Supreme Court decision construing its language narrowly could
“undermine the ability of our negotiators into—to make treaties in
1
2

12-158).

Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 229 (2012).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) (No.
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the future,”3 Verrilli explained. The common reaction from the Justices was skepticism. “[I]s that what you’re telling me, that if I write
the opinion that I think the law requires me to write, that I somehow
am hurting the national security interests of the United States?,”4
asked Justice Breyer. Justice Alito had already posed the question to
Bond’s lawyer: “[I]s there any possibility that there is any other country in the world that has the slightest interest in how the United States
or any of its subdivisions deals with the particular situation that’s involved in this case?”5 This skepticism extended to the Chief Justice as
well: “Now, usually, when we have a case that implicates significant
and serious bilateral concerns, we get a lot of briefs and all that from
our—our treaty partners. Is—is there any concern that’s been expressed in any concrete way by them about whether Mrs. Bond is
prosecuted?,”6 Chief Justice Roberts asked.
The scene from the oral argument in Bond v. United States7 might
have surprised many of those watching and commenting on the nomination of John Roberts to be Chief Justice eight years earlier. Prior to
his confirmation hearing, many expressed concern that he might be
too deferential to Executive power and to calls for Executive discretion, particularly on issues of foreign affairs and national security.8
Based on his time working in the Department of Justice and as associate White House Counsel, as well as specific memoranda he wrote,
commentators pegged Roberts as a “real executive power guy,”9 “a
government attorney,”10 and someone who “probably will sympathize
3

Id. at 42.

Id. at 41.
Id. at 17.
6 Id. at 46.
7 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
8 See, e.g., Robyn E. Blumner, Roberts’ Rules Put U.S. at Risk, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
July 24, 2005, at 4P (“This case is instructive on Roberts’ deference toward executive power.
Roberts appears willing to keep the courts out of Bush’s hair while he unilaterally alters the
rules on the civilized treatment of prisoners that the world has adopted and we have embraced
for more than 50 years.”); Peter M. Shane & Reed Hundt, Protective of the Presidency, WASH.
POST, Sept. 11, 2005, at B7 (opining that “there is every reason to suspect that as chief justice,
Roberts could well move the Supreme Court in a much more conservative direction on an allimportant but easily overlooked set of issues: constitutional checks and balances as applied to
the president”); Henry Weinstein, Debating the Power of the Presidency, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14,
2005, at A20 (observing that “many legal experts on the left and the right . . . believe that
executive power could be the area in which a Justice Roberts would have the biggest impact”).
9 Talk of the Nation: What the Documents Say About John Roberts, NPR (July 28, 2005,
12:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=4775271 (interview
with Jeffrey Rosen).
10 Fox Special Report with Brit Hume: Discussion of Judge Roberts as Nominee, FOX
4
5
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with presidential claims of authority.”11 They noted a “thread [in his
work] favoring executive power.”12 Given a perception that the Court
was already too deferential to the executive branch on foreign affairs
and national security, senators were urged to pay particular attention
to Roberts’s views on these issues during the confirmation hearings.13
When the hearings arrived, so too did these questions.14 But the
future Chief Justice succeeded in defusing them by invoking the example of Justice Robert Jackson, who, Roberts reminded the senators,
was a strong advocate for Executive power when he was
FDR’s attorney general, one of the strongest, and yet he
could issue a decision like the Youngstown decision, not only
concluding that President Truman lacked the authority, even
in times of war, to seize the steel mills, but also setting forth
the framework about how to analyze these decisions in a way
that is particularly sensitive to the role of Congress, as well.15
As explained at another point during the hearings, Justice Jackson was
“someone whose job it was to promote and defend an expansive view
of Executive powers as Attorney General, which he did very effectively, and then when he went on the Court . . . he took an entirely
different view of a lot of issues.”16 For some senators, the example of
Justice Jackson was enough to allay concerns.17 But only time would
NEWS (July 22, 2005) [hereinafter Fox Special Report], available at 2005 WLNR 11523971 (discussion with Jeff Birnbaum).
11 Weinstein, supra note 8; see also id. (quoting Pepperdine University law professor
Douglas W. Kmiec, who observed that “[i]nsofar as he served in the White House, you have an
inclination by preparation to be sensitive to things that encroach on presidential authority”).
12 Fox Special Report, supra note 10 (discussion with Fred Barnes).
13 See, e.g., Editorial, A Judicious Choice, L.A. TIMES, July 20, 2005, at B12 (“It is entirely
appropriate for the Senate to probe a nominee’s judicial philosophy . . . . Senators will have to
ascertain just how much further Roberts would defer to the executive in pursuing the war on
terrorism.”); Craig Gilbert & Katherine M. Skiba, Kohl, Feingold Preparing Probing Questions,
Respectfully, for Roberts, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 11, 2005, at 6A.
14 See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 43–46
(2005) [hereinafter Roberts Confirmation Hearing] (statement of Sen. Durbin, Member, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary); id. at 240, 279–80, 350; Linda Greenhouse, By Invoking a Former
Justice, the Nominee Says Much but Gives Away Little, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at A24 (discussing questions from Sens. Leahy and Feingold); Carol Rosenberg, Detainee Issues Await New
Court, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 18, 2005, at 9A (discussing question from Sen. Graham).
15 Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 14, at 280 (statement of John Roberts, Nominee for Chief Justice of the United States).
16 Id. at 153.
17 See, e.g., Senator Patrick Leahy, Statement on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr.
to Be Chief Justice of the United States (Sept. 22, 2005), available at http://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/leahy_statement_09_22_05.pdf (“I expect Judge Roberts to act in the tradition of Justice Jackson . . . . When he joins the Supreme Court he can no
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tell how deferential Chief Justice Roberts and the Roberts Court
would actually be.
In the nearly ten years that have passed since Chief Justice Roberts’s confirmation hearings, the Roberts Court has been active in foreign affairs law, deciding cases on the detention and trial of enemy
combatants, foreign sovereign immunity, the domestic effect of treaties, the extraterritorial reach of federal statutes, the preemption of
state laws in the field of foreign affairs, and the scope of the political
question doctrine, among others. It is time to look back and assess the
Roberts Court’s legacy within foreign affairs law.
The result is stark and surprising. Looking at the string of foreign
affairs-related cases decided by the Roberts Court, an as-yet undernoticed trend becomes apparent. Nominee Roberts’s invocation of
Justice Jackson turns out to have been only partially right. Neither the
Chief Justice nor the Court more broadly has been particularly deferential to the President. On the contrary, as this Article will explain,
the Court has exhibited a deep distrust not only of the executive
branch, but also of Congress and the lower federal courts in the realm
of foreign affairs.
Even more surprising is how the Court has gotten there. Functionalist interpretative approaches have long dominated foreign affairs law. Although they have more often than not been used to
support judicial deference to the political branches on these issues,
they have also provided limits on that deference, as Justice Jackson’s
famously functionalist approach in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer18 demonstrates.19 But in a string of decisions, from Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld20 through Medellı́n v. Texas,21 Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,22 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton,23 Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,24 and most recently, Bond, the Roberts
Court has jettisoned its traditional functionalism in favor of formallonger simply defer to presidential authority.”). But see Jesse J. Holland, Roberts Picks Up a Big
Nod from Democrat Leahy, STAR-LEDGER, Sept. 22, 2005, at 3 (noting that Sen. Jon Corzine
“said Roberts has ‘sidestepped central questions about the fundamental rights and constitutional
protections Americans hold dear,’ ” including ‘“a woman’s right to choose, civil rights, the rights
of consumers, federalism, the scope of executive power, and government’s ability to help those
Americans who need it most’ ”).
18 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
19 See infra Part II.
20 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
21 Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
22 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
23 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012).
24 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
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ism. And with this shift in rhetoric have come constraints on the discretion of the federal government that are deeper and more powerful
than have been seen in some time.
This as-yet-unrecognized shift25 to formalism is notable for at
least three reasons. First, it marks a significant break with the functionalism that dominated the Court’s approach to foreign affairs law
over much of the twentieth century26 and that rose to particular prominence towards the end of the Rehnquist, or perhaps better-characterized, “Souter Court.”27 Some close observers have noticed a more
general trend towards formalism in the rhetoric of the Roberts
Court.28 Even if foreign affairs cases have only been part of this
broader trend, the shift in approach to these cases is worth noting.
25 Observers have noted the apparent formalism of one or another of the Roberts Court
cases, but not the broader trend. See generally Ingrid Wuerth, Medellı́n: The New, New Formalism?, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1 (2009) (noting the formalism of Medellı́n); Michael J. Turner,
Comment, Fade to Black: The Formalization of Jackson’s Youngstown Taxonomy by Hamdan
and Medellı́n, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 665 (2009); Peter Spiro, Does Medellı́n Revive Barclays Bank?,
OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 16, 2009, 4:36 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2009/01/16/does-medellin-revivebarclays-bank/. In fact, it remains common to criticize the Court for its functionalism, in its
various forms. See, e.g., David H. Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L. REV. 953, 1041–44
(2014).
This though may be starting to change. In a new article citing this one, Ganesh Sitaraman
and Ingrid Wuerth argue not only that the Court has been normalizing foreign relations law but
also that the Court is right to do so, developing a sophisticated and formidable account of how
ordinary constitutional, statutory, and administrative law principles might better make sense of
and improve foreign relations law doctrine. Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). Normalization may
not be completely coextensive with a shift towards formalism, but the two are very closely connected, as this Article explains.
26 See Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70
U. COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1424–29 (1999); Stephen I. Vladeck, Foreign Affairs Originalism in
Youngstown’s Shadow, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 29, 31 (2008).
27 See infra Part II.A.
28 See, e.g., Michael P. Allen, The Roberts Court and How to Say What the Law Is, 40
STETSON L. REV. 671, 694 (2011) (describing the new formalism as one that emphasizes rules,
relies on the understanding of the Framers, and issues broad interpretive rulings without necessarily overruling prior decisions); Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 16, 35 (2013) (noting the formalism of Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting
Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477 (2010)); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, the
New Formalism, and the Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem
of Presidential Oversight of State-Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L.J.
1599, 1615–25 (2012) (discussing the new formalism of the Roberts Court); Emily Hammond
Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J. 1763, 1774
(2012) (describing the formalistic, unitary executive theory of presidential control); see also Kent
H. Barnett, Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1360–63
(2012) (arguing that the Court in Free Enterprise Fund mixed formalist language with prior functionalist analyses). Cases cited for this trend include Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612
(2013), Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. 477, New Process
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Across wide swathes of American law, the formalist-functionalist
divide has long served as a battlefield over which members of the
Court have fought, with one side or the other gaining or losing
strength at any given time.29 Few such battles, though, have been
fought over foreign affairs law. Feeding off a perception that foreign
affairs issues are somehow different from other constitutional or statutory ones, functionalism has long been the dominant approach to foreign affairs and national security cases.30 Dealing with foreign states
requires a special level of discretion, flexibility, and speed—the conventional story goes—and, as such, the political branches need more
room in fulfilling their constitutional obligations. This preference for
functionalist interpretations has, in turn, created a self-fulfilling
prophecy, emphasizing the differences between foreign affairs issues
and domestic ones, for which formalist approaches have and could
more often be embraced. It is almost a cliché in American constitutional law that foreign affairs are simply different,31 that courts are
Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674 (2010), United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010), District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). Commentators have observed that the formalist rhetoric of these decisions has been aimed primarily at
Congress, favoring Executive power over legislative intrusions. See Krotoszynski, supra, at
1617–19; Meazell, supra, at 1774–75. By contrast, this Article argues that the Roberts Court’s
formalism has been aimed as much at constraining the President as it has at Congress. See infra
Part II.B.
29 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Formalism, Functionalism, Ignorance, Judges, 22 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 13, 17 (1998) (describing trends in formalist and functionalist decisions); Krotoszynski, supra note 28, at 1605–07 (contrasting the predominantly formalist approach of the Burger and Roberts Courts with the functionalist decisions of the Rehnquist Court); Peter L.
Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987) (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court has vacillated over the years between using a formalistic approach to separation-of-powers issues . . . and
a functional approach”); see also Lee A. Deneen, Note, Defeating a Wolf Clad as a Wolf: Formalism and Functionalism in Separation-of-Powers Suits Against the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 48 GA. L. REV. 579, 583 (2014) (describing formalist-functionalist divide in
separation of powers Court decisions).
30 See Vladeck, supra note 26, at 30–31 (describing Youngstown’s functionalist approach);
see also Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5–9
(1993) (describing and criticizing the power of functionalist accounts of Executive power over
foreign affairs).
31 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936) (“That
there are differences between [foreign and domestic affairs], and that these differences are fundamental, may not be doubted.”); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION
5–6 (1972) (“Because the constitutional allocations of power to conduct foreign affairs are different from those for domestic matters, issues between the President and Congress in foreign affairs
are not the same ‘separation-of-powers’ controversies that have roiled the governance of domestic affairs.”); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Are Foreign Affairs Different?, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1980, 1984 (1993) (reviewing THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS:
DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992)) (discussing “pervasive judicial
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warier to scrutinize—and more likely to defer to—the decisions of
Congress and the President than in domestic affairs, that the constitutional strictures that might otherwise constrain political branch actions
are loosened,32 and that the federalism concerns that might otherwise
limit the political branches largely disappear.33
Any shift away from these conventional wisdoms towards more
formalist approaches would be worthy of note. A trend as stark as the
one described in this Article is an upheaval that must be described
and understood.

sense that foreign affairs are ‘different’ ”); David A. Koplow, Arms Control Inspection: Constitutional Restrictions on Treaty Verification in the United States, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 229, 325 (1988)
(“Foreign affairs in general, and national security matters in particular, are traditionally accorded special treatment in American courts.”); id. at 325 n.605 (“Foreign policy matters are
generically different from other constitutional litigation.”); see also Jules Lobel, Fundamental
Norms, International Law, and the Extraterritorial Constitution, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 307, 319
(2011) (“Kennedy’s Boumediene compromise is likely normatively rooted in the perception that
foreign affairs is different from the domestic order, and that the Constitution should thus be
interpreted differently and more flexibly in the foreign policy arena.”).
32 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 645 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“I should indulge the widest latitude of interpretation to sustain [the President’s]
exclusive function to command the instruments of national force, at least when turned against
the outside world for the security of our society. But, when it is turned inward . . . it should have
no such indulgence.”); Mingtai Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United Parcel Serv., 177 F.3d 1142,
1144 (9th Cir. 1999) (“It is axiomatic that ‘the conduct of foreign relations is committed by the
Constitution to the political departments of the Federal Government; [and] that the propriety of
the exercise of that power is not open to judicial review.’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 222–23 (1942))); see also Republic of Austria v. Altmann,
541 U.S. 677, 678, 696 (2004) (describing foreign sovereign immunity as a “sui generis” context
with regard to retroactivity); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (finding the question whether the President or Congress controls treaty termination to
be a nonjusticiable political dispute); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321–22
(1972) (“express[ing] no opinion” as to whether the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement
would apply “with respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents”); Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (“It seems fair to assume that the Court did not have
rules like the act of state doctrine in mind when it decided Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.”); HENKIN,
supra note 31, at 6 (“Even the modest role played by the courts in foreign affairs is different,
asserting different judicial authority, maintaining different relations with the political branches,
monitoring different limitations on the States.”).
33 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (“Our system of government is such that the
interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the people of the whole
nation, imperatively requires that the federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left
entirely free from local interference.”); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606
(1889) (“For local interests the several States of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.”); see
also Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 604 (“While under our Constitution and form of government
the great mass of local matters is controlled by local authorities, the United States, in their
relation to foreign countries and their subjects or citizens, are one nation . . . .”).
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Second, while the shift to formalism on other issues seems to
have come from the conservative wing of the Roberts Court (and opposed by its more liberal wing),34 the shift in foreign affairs law seems
to reflect an imperfectly overlapping agreement across the various
wings of the Court. Foreign affairs decisions authored by both the
Court’s more liberal and conservative justices have embraced formalist rhetoric.35 Even disagreements with the majority opinions are
often couched not in functionalist terms but in alternative formalist
ones.36
Third, and most importantly, the shift seems to reflect a change in
Court philosophy. As will be discussed in the next Part, formalism
and functionalism are best seen as rhetorical devices or moves that
frame and justify a decision rather than doctrinal rules that dictate
specific answers. As such, formalist rhetoric can serve various purposes. Some commentators have suggested that a shift to formalism
could loosen judicial control over foreign affairs doctrine and return
control to the political branches.37 Alternatively, a shift to formalism
could be merely political, reflecting the momentary ascendance of certain views in the judiciary and the political branches. Formalism provides a useful, if not necessarily principled, justification for an
otherwise political decision. Some might be tempted to interpret the
Roberts Court’s formalism that way, as nothing more than a conservative Court’s response to a Democratic President and, at times, Democratic Congress. Undoubtedly, ideological differences have played a
role.38
But this trend seems considerably more robust, extending back
into the prior Republican presidency and garnering support from
ideologically opposed Justices. And, as this Article will explain, reading the opinions reveals broader principles at work. Binding these
formalist opinions together is a deep distrust of other government actors and a concomitant desire to constrain their discretion. This formalism is not a product of judicial humility or restraint; this formalism
34 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010)
(Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy forming the majority);
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (same); see also Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct.
2594 (2011) (same, with Justice Scalia concurring).
35 Compare Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (majority opinion delivered by Justice Stevens), with Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (majority opinion
delivered by Justice Scalia).
36 See infra notes 332–33, 363–64.
37 See generally Goldsmith, supra note 26.
38 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 947, 948
(2008) (asserting that “this is the most conservative Court since the mid-1930s”).
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is about a Court retaking control. Where the Court earlier used functionalism to give the political branches, and in particular the Executive, greater room to maneuver in a globalizing world, the Court now
seems determined to rein them in. This seems to be the common message of Justice Stevens’s opinion in Hamdan, formalistically rejecting
the Executive’s power to establish military commissions,39 and Chief
Justice Roberts’s opinion in Medellı́n, formalistically rejecting the Executive’s ability to preempt state criminal laws that violate American
international obligations.40 In an era of globalization in which the
United States exerts its regulatory authority around the world and in
which domestic affairs are increasingly of international concern, unconstrained Executive discretion seems to the Court a dangerous proposition. If state criminal procedure41 and random lovers’ quarrels42
can be plausibly described as having foreign affairs implications, and
foreign-based banks,43 oil companies,44 terrorists, and insurgents45 can
be subjected to the full force of federal regulation, the mere mention
of the term “foreign affairs” or “national security” cannot be enough
to release the government or its policies from judicial scrutiny.46 To
do otherwise would be to place enormous trust in the executive
branch, Congress, and the lower federal courts. And the Roberts
Court’s message is that that trust simply is not there.
Part I begins by explaining the formalist-functionalist divide in
constitutional law and how it has traditionally manifested itself with
regard to foreign affairs. Part II looks more closely at the foreign affairs jurisprudence of the “Souter Court,” contrasting the functionalism of decisions like American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi,47
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,48 Sosa v. AlvarezMachain,49 Republic of Austria v. Altmann,50 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,51 F.
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 635.
Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 529–32 (2008).
41 See id. at 529–30 (rejecting argument that President can rely on foreign affairs powers to
enforce a non-self-executing international treaty to preempt a state law of criminal procedure).
42 See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2091–92 (2014) (refusing to “transform the
[chemical weapons] statute from one whose core concerns are acts of war, assassination, and
terrorism into a massive federal anti-poisoning regime that reaches the simplest of assaults”).
43 See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247
(2010)).
44 See infra Part II.B.4 (discussing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659
(2013)).
45 See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)).
46 See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text.
47 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
48 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
49 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
39
40
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Hoffman-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S.A.,52 and others, with the formalism of the Roberts Court decisions in Hamdan, Medellı́n, Morrison, Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority,53 Zivotofsky, and Kiobel.
Along the way, it explores the judicial philosophy animating these
contrasting approaches. Part II also explores the key dividing line
within the current Court: how much to constrain the courts themselves
(particularly, the lower federal courts). Whereas a fragile consensus
seems to have emerged that the political branches need to be fenced
in with more formal checks on their power, the Court seems divided
over (and perhaps a bit unsure) whether the federal courts need similar rules. It is this line that seems to divide the majority from the
dissenting and concurring justices in Morrison, Kiobel, and
Boumediene v. Bush,54 and that is likely to continue to divide the
Court in future cases.
Part III considers some implications of the current formalist
trend. For one thing, the resilience of this trend suggests the type of
foreign affairs cases that may pique the Court’s interest over the next
few terms. The Justices’ evident skepticism regarding the government’s pleas for foreign affairs deference during the Bond oral argument, and later evidenced in their opinions in BG Group PLC v.
Republic of Argentina55 and Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital,
Ltd.,56 is far from surprising. That sense of distrust has been brewing
for some time and can be expected to continue. Nor is it surprising
that the Court will decide Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry
(“Zivotofsky II”)57 this Term. The case for the first time confronts the
scope of the presidential recognition power, a highly functionalist
power long invoked to grant the President nearly unreviewable authority over questions of U.S. foreign policy.58 Cases revisiting the
50

Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004).

51

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).

52

F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004).

53

Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012).

54

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).

BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1208 (2014) (“We do not accept the
Solicitor General’s view as applied to the treaty before us.”); see also infra Part III.A.
55

56 Republic of Arg. v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2258 (2014) (noting that “Argentina and the United States urge us to consider the worrisome international-relations consequences of siding with the lower court,” but concluding that “[t]hese apprehensions are better
directed to [Congress]”); see also infra note 450 and accompanying text.

Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State (Zivotofsky II), 725 F.3d 197 (D.C. Cir.
2013), cert. granted sub nom. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 134 S. Ct. 1873 (2014).
57

58

See infra Part III.A.
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broadly interpreted Foreign Commerce Clause or the scope of the
Charming Betsy59 presumption might garner similar interest.60
But not all future questions will provide easy platforms for renewed formalism and reinvigorated checks. A second possible implication of the Court’s new (new)61 formalism is that cases that cannot
easily be resolved with formal tools will not be resolved at all. A renewed commitment to formalism may also mean stricter pleading62 or
standing63 standards or a sort of backdoor functionalism through the
denial of certiorari in thorny foreign affairs cases.64
What all of this suggests is that Court-watchers, commentators,
and critics will need to shift their focus. Critiques of the Court’s excessive functionalism in foreign affairs remain common.65 But the
trend identified here suggests that that horse may already be dead.
Instead of watching to make sure the Court is not being too functionalist or too deferential, Court-watchers may be well-advised to look
out for the opposite, aware of the potential for excessive formalism
and the possibility of an imperial Court.
I. FORMALISM AND FUNCTIONALISM
FOREIGN AFFAIRS LAW

IN

U.S.

A. As Interpretative Frames
The choice between formal and functional tools is one of the
great, enduring divides in U.S. constitutional and statutory interpretation. Should the Constitution and statutes be interpreted strictly, to
guarantee that all act within established rules and roles, or broadly,
with an eye towards achieving the government’s or Constitution’s
goals? On the one hand, the federal government “is acknowledged by
all[ ] to be one of enumerated powers.”66 Moreover, we are taught
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
For an example of a more formalist and more conservative approach that a court could
take to the doctrine, see Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 472 F.3d 872, 879 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (declining to invoke the Charming Betsy doctrine where the
language of the statute is “plain”), as well as the discussion infra Part III.
61 See generally Wuerth, supra note 25. In 1999, Jack Goldsmith suggested that the Court
might be embracing a “New Formalism” in foreign affairs law. See Goldsmith, supra note 26, at
1. To the extent he was correct, this latest trend would have to be the new new formalism.
62 See infra note 455 and accompanying text.
63 See infra note 456 and accompanying text.
64 See infra notes 459–61 and the accompanying discussion of post-Boumediene detainee
cases.
65 See Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 41
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 96 (2009); Moore, supra note 25, at 955–56; Vladeck, supra note 26, at 31.
66 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
59
60
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that within the federal government “[t]he Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers . . . into three defined categories, legislative, executive and judicial, to assure, as nearly as possible, that each
Branch of government would confine itself to its assigned responsibility.”67 On the other hand, we are taught “never [to] forget that it is a
constitution we are expounding,”68 and that the goal of the Constitution is to create “a workable government.”69
As William Eskridge has explained, the tension between these
two visions, one formalist and the other functionalist, can take a number of forms in judicial opinions. One manifestation is the choice between rules and standards. “Formalism might be associated with
bright-line rules that seek to place determinate, readily enforceable
limits on public actors. Functionalism, at least as an antipode, might
be associated with standards or balancing tests that seek to provide
public actors with greater flexibility.”70 A different manifestation is in
the forms of reasoning we might use to answer hard questions. “Formalism might be understood as deduction from authoritative constitutional text, structure, original intent, or all three working together.
Functionalism might be understood as induction from constitutional
policy and practice, with practice typically being examined over
time.”71 Finally, a third manifestation might be with regard to goals.
“Formalism might be understood as giving priority to rule of law values such as transparency, predictability, and continuity in law. Functionalism, in turn, might be understood as emphasizing pragmatic
values like adaptability, efficacy, and justice in law.”72 Formalism is
essentially backward-looking, tethering interpretations to existing
doctrines, prior precedents, and original text. Functionalism looks to
the present and future, asking what rule will lead to the best results
(understood, of course, within the general constitutional design).
A different way of putting it, quite apparent in the foreign affairs
context, might be that formal approaches emphasize constraint and
functional approaches emphasize empowerment. Formalist techniques are often accompanied by sober appeals to the importance of
keeping all constitutional actors within their designated roles. FuncINS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407.
69 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
70 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 21 (1998).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 22.
67
68
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tional techniques are invoked along with rhetoric of exigency, efficiency, and effectiveness.73 This is quite apparent in the two opinions
that often stand as archetypes of formalism and functionalism, which
are, respectively, Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion in INS v.
Chadha74 and Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown.75
In the first case, Chadha, the Court was faced with a challenge to
the one-house veto. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act,76
the Attorney General was delegated the discretion to suspend deportation of certain deportable individuals for whom deportation would
result in “extremely unusual hardship.”77 This decision was subject to
a legislative veto by either house of Congress.78 Justice White, in dissent, appealed to functionalism, describing the legislative veto as “a
central means by which Congress secures the accountability of executive and independent agencies,”79 noting its long pedigree,80 and worrying about the consequences of overriding it.81 Moreover, Justice
White explained that nothing in the Constitution specifically forbade
it.82 The majority took a different view. In a paean to formalism,
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, explained that the Constitution established a clear process and order for lawmaking that included both bicameralism and presentment. The political branches
could not simply agree to rearrange it, regardless of how “efficient,
73 Cf. Theodore J. Lowi, Afterword: Presidential Power and the Ideological Struggle Over
Its Interpretation, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 227, 238–39 (Martin
L. Fausold & Alan Shank eds., 1991) (contrasting a “Fast Track” of American politics characterized by “secrecy, unilateral action, energy, commitment, decisiveness, where time is always of the
essence,” with a “Slow Track” or “a Separation of Powers Track, permitted by a longer time
horizon, and desirable wherever time permits, yet highly unpredictable, uncontrollable, public,
full of leaky holes, and dominated not merely by the legislature but by a large and pluralistic
process fueled by greed, otherwise called the pursuit of happiness”).
74

INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J.
concurring).
75

76

Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).

77

Id. § 244(a)(1)–(c)(2), 66 Stat. at 214–17 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1)(D)

(2012)).
78

Id. § 244(b)–(c), 66 Stat. at 216.

79

Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967–68 (White, J., dissenting).

Id. at 968 (“[O]ver the past five decades, the legislative veto has been placed in nearly
200 statutes. The device is known in every field of governmental concern . . . .” (footnote
omitted)).
80

81 See id. at 973 (“Perhaps there are other means of accommodation and accountability,
but the increasing reliance of Congress upon the legislative veto suggests that the alternatives to
which Congress must now turn are not entirely satisfactory.”).
82

Id. at 977.
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convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government”83 it
might be. Quite the contrary, the Constitution “impose[s] burdens on
governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable, but those hard choices were consciously made by men who
had lived under a form of government that permitted arbitrary governmental acts to go unchecked.”84 Formalism enforces restraint.
Functionalism, in contrast, is at the heart of Justice Jackson’s influential concurrence in Youngstown, now often read as the central
opinion in that case.85 Recognizing that the Constitution “must be understood as an eighteenth-century sketch of a government hoped for,
not as a blueprint of the Government that is,”86 the opinion eschews
formal categories, declaring that “[t]he actual art of governing under
our Constitution does not, and cannot, conform to judicial definitions
of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses, or even
single Articles torn from context.”87 Instead, Justice Jackson explains,
assessing President Truman’s Korean War-era attempt to seize the nation’s steel mills required an understanding of the fluctuating relationship between Congress and the President. Justice Jackson suggests
that any Executive action can be judged based on where it falls within
a “grouping of [three] practical situations.”88 In the first, “the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress.”89 In such cases, the President’s “authority is at its
maximum,”90 and a challenge to his actions will only succeed if the
federal government “as an undivided whole lacks the power.”91 In the
second, the President acts against a backdrop of congressional silence.92 In such cases, “any actual test of power is likely to depend on
the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables, rather
than on abstract theories of law.”93 Finally, in a third category of
Id. at 944 (majority opinion).
Id. at 959.
85 See, e.g., Louis Fisher, Foreword to MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL
SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER, at xii (Duke Univ. Press 1994) (1971)
(“The part of Youngstown that has had the greatest impact on contemporary constitutional analysis is Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion.”).
86 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
87 Id. at 635.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 636–37.
92 See id. at 637.
93 Id.
83
84
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cases, the President acts against the explicit or implicit will of Congress.94 There, the President’s “power is at its lowest ebb.”95 President Truman’s actions, Justice Jackson found, fell into the third
category.96 But the opinion goes further, surveying how the powers of
the presidency have grown beyond anything the Framers could have
imagined.97 Giving in to the President’s claims of necessity seemed
neither warranted nor wise.98 Even as the President lost, the argument was one about effective government, not about textual
constraint.
As Chadha and Youngstown suggest, applying formalist or functionalist tests will have different results, depending on the specific
question presented and the area of law.99 Many observers have noted
that in the foreign affairs context, functionalism favors the executive
branch.100 Observers often point to decisions like United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,101 Dames & Moore v. Regan,102 or
Garamendi, which invoke the unique functions of the President as
“sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations”103 to justify expansive Executive power. In a sense, this
should not be surprising. When a President’s actions are challenged, it
is likely to be on the basis of either a contrary congressional act or
constitutional provision. Given the comparatively few explicit powers
See id.
Id.
96 See id. at 640.
97 See id. (“Some clauses could be made almost unworkable, as well as immutable, by
refusal to indulge some latitude of interpretation for changing times. I have heretofore, and do
now, give to the enumerated powers the scope and elasticity afforded by what seem to be reasonable practical implications instead of the rigidity dictated by a doctrinaire textualism.”).
98 Id. at 652.
99 For example, in the administrative law context, functionalist approaches are sometimes
said to favor the sharing of power between Congress and the President, rather than one branch
or the other. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 759 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the majority’s “distressingly formalistic view” barring efficient government action). The disagreement between Justices Burger and White in Chadha exemplifies this well. See INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967–68 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
100 See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 87, 109 (2002) (“[T]hose invoking [functionalist] language generally do so to suggest that
the ‘flexible’ approach warrants upholding the challenged action.”); Knowles, supra note 65, at
96 (“[P]roponents of executive branch dominance have triumphed in the courts and in practice, a
victory driven largely by functional considerations.”); see also Monaghan, supra note 30, at 8–9
(describing, yet criticizing, how functionalist logic has been used to support broad Executive
authority).
101 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
102 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
103 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
94
95
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granted to the President in the Constitution,104 it may take a functionalist account, rather than a formalist one, to find in favor of the
Executive.
Yet, even if this is unsurprising, it is also only partly true. For one
thing, applying a functional analysis need not result in victory for the
President, as Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown proves. But it also
focuses too much on the congressional-executive separation of powers
questions to the exclusion of others.105 Foreign affairs law involves a
wide range of other issues, including the political question doctrine,
treaty interpretation, the preemption of state laws, foreign sovereign
immunity, the act of state doctrine, the extraterritoriality of statutes,
and others. Most of these foreign affairs issues do not pit the President against Congress, at least not usually or explicitly, and it is harder
to say that applying a functionalist approach in these cases consistently favors one branch over another.
Some functionalist foreign affairs decisions will still favor executive over congressional authority. Functional accounts of the President’s role in negotiating treaties and managing American foreign
policy support amorphous doctrines of deference towards the executive branch in treaty interpretation.106 Similarly, looser versions of the
political question doctrine that ask functional questions about
whether a particular case might embarrass the other branches or undermine the government’s ability to speak with one voice in foreign
affairs tend to insulate the President’s acts from greater scrutiny.107
But other issues and doctrines may be harder to categorize as
exclusively advancing Executive authority. Preemption, for example,
usually pits the federal government against the states. A more formalist analysis might mean a narrower reading of a congressional statute
or Executive policy. This, in turn, will make the Court less likely to
find a conflict with state laws and less likely to preempt. A functionalist reading, on the other hand, might look more broadly to the federal
104 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“[I]t is relevant to note the gap that exists between the President’s paper powers
and his real powers. The Constitution does not disclose the measure of the actual controls
wielded by the modern presidential office.”).
105 See Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign
Relations Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 783, 817–18, 820 (2011); see also Knowles, supra note 65, at
92, 94–99; Vladeck, supra note 26, at 37–38.
106 See Pearlstein, supra note 105, at 792–801; see also Alex Glashausser, Difference and
Deference in Treaty Interpretation, 50 VILL. L. REV. 25, 36–37, 41–44 (2005).
107 See Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 980–84 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Bancoult v.
McNamara, 445 F.3d 427, 431–33, 437–38 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190,
193–98 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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statute’s or policy’s goals, reading into it not only what it explicitly
does, but also all the decisions about what it does not. Such a broad
reading is more likely to suggest either a conflict between the state
and federal government or that the federal government has sought to
occupy the field. The result of such functionalism is thus likely to be a
victory for the Congress and the President together against the
States.108
Things get even more complicated when the powers of Congress
and the Executive are not squarely at issue. Oftentimes, for example,
the question revolves around the rights of individual litigants to sue.
When can individuals sue foreign states or their instrumentalities?
When can individuals sue regarding acts taken by foreign states within
their own territory? When can individuals use federal law to gain redress for conduct occurring somewhere else, whether a securities violation, a price-fixing scheme, employment discrimination, copyright
infringement, or human rights violations? These cases are not always
easy to categorize as matters of political branch authority. Certainly
in some cases the executive branch is the defendant, as in, for example, detainee cases.109 Sometimes, the constitutionality of Congress’s
actions may actually be the target of the suit, as they were in
Boumediene.110 But in many of these cases, the role of the political
branches may be much more attenuated.
That does not mean that one could not also look at these cases in
separation of powers terms. One way to look at the plaintiffs’ relative
rights to sue would be in terms of congressional delegation: to what
108 Even if functionalist decisions like Garamendi, United States v. Pink, and United States
v. Belmont suggest that the President alone may be able to preempt state laws, they say nothing
about what would have happened had Congress been affirmatively opposed. See Am. Ins. Ass’n
v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413–25 (2003); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 227–30 (1942);
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 327–28, 330–32 (1937). Thus, the better reading of the
whole group is that, in general, functionalism favors the federal government as a whole over the
states. See, e.g., Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331 (“Plainly, the external powers of the United States are
to be exercised without regard to state laws or policies.”).
109 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 558 (2006). This will also be the case, for
example, with Bivens actions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 668 (2009); Arar v. Ashcroft,
585 F.3d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 2009). More tangentially, the Executive may be implicated in cases
against private defendants that somehow challenge government actions. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2010) (challenging the United States’s
invocation of the state secret doctrine in a suit against a U.S. corporation that allegedly provided
“flight planning and logistical support services” to transport individuals who were ultimately
detained and tortured). Functionalist analysis may favor the Executive here, as it does in the
context of the state secrets privilege. See, e.g., id. at 1078–82, 1086–87, 1089–90.
110 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008) (challenging Congress’s ability to
deny Guantanamo detainees access to habeas corpus).
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extent should Congress be able to delegate (even provisionally) the
scope and meaning of legislation to private litigants and courts? Arguably, Justice Scalia’s formalist rejection in Morrison111 of the Second
Circuit’s test for extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws, a
test developed through decades of litigation and long-acquiesced to by
Congress (as noted by the plaintiffs),112 was a denunciation of that
form of silent, subcontracted congressional legislation. The same
might be said of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Kiobel.113 Overall,
however, the formalism-functionalism divide in these cases does not
seem to really be about the political branches. Formalism and functionalism might line up as defendant-friendly or plaintiff-friendly, respectively, as the majorities and dissent in Sosa, Kiobel, and Morrison
might suggest. But they need not.114 Perhaps the better interpretation
is that functional approaches favor the federal judiciary, rather than
plaintiffs, Congress, or the President, giving lower federal court judges
discretion in how to balance foreign affairs concerns in each case.115
This point is illustrated well by the Court’s decisions regarding
the act of state doctrine. It is very hard to categorize either seemingly
functionalist or seemingly formalist opinions as pro- or anti-executive
111 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (“When a statute gives
no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”); infra Part II.B.3.
112 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 278 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The Second Circuit refined its test
over several decades and dozens of cases, with the tacit approval of Congress and the Commission and with the general assent of its sister Circuits. That history is a reason we should give
additional weight to the Second Circuit’s ‘judge-made’ doctrine, not a reason to denigrate it.”).
113 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (applying the presumption against extraterritorial application to the Alien Tort Statute and holding that the ATS
does not apply to conduct occurring abroad because there is no explicit indication to the contrary within the statute’s text).
114 Justice Scalia’s more formalist version of the act of state doctrine in W.S. Kirkpatrick &
Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., International, 493 U.S. 400, 405–09 (1990), is a good example. There, formalism narrows the doctrine such that it applies to fewer cases. Id. at 409–10.
The result of that formalism is that more plaintiffs rather than fewer are able to seek relief.
It should also be noted that formalism and functionalism are not always pitted against each
other. In some cases, the two sides may represent warring formalist approaches or warring functionalist approaches. See infra Part II.A.4 (discussing Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S.
677 (2004)). Justice Stevens, for the majority, applies a functionalist analysis of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunity Act to deny the applicability of the antiretroactivity norm, in turn allowing
the plaintiff to sue under current rules. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 696. In dissent, Justice Kennedy
finds that the antiretroactivity principle does apply, but in the process creates a different sort of
functionalist rule, in which the Court might defer to the Executive’s opinion on sovereign immunity as it would have back in the 1940s. Id. at 734 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
115 This dovetails well with Jack Goldsmith’s suggestion. See Goldsmith, supra note 26, at
1396 (arguing that the “foreign relations effects test rests on questionable assumptions about the
nature of foreign relations law and the proper role of federal courts”); see also infra notes 123–27
and accompanying text.
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authority. The Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino116 famously found the authority behind the act of state doctrine not in the
Constitution, international law, or statute, but in separation of powers
principles with “constitutional underpinnings.”117 Functional considerations, including guarding against judicial interference in executive
branch foreign policy, supported the doctrine.118 And yet, the Court
took pains to ignore the executive branch’s specific views on the legality of Cuban expropriations119 and specifically rejected a “reverse
Bernstein” test that would have them apply the doctrine only when
asked to by the Executive.120 On the flipside, Justice Scalia invoked a
more formalist version of the act of state doctrine in W.S. Kirkpatrick
& Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., International121 based on
clear rules about when it would apply.122 Here too the Executive’s
view of what should happen in the particular case was ignored.123
What really seems to distinguish the functionalism of Sabbatino from
the formalism of Environmental Tectonics is not the deference to the
Executive, but the amount of room left for lower federal courts to
decide the contours of the act of state doctrine.
As a summary, we might thus say that foreign affairs functionalism seems to generally favor the President against Congress, both political branches against the states, and the federal judiciary against
everything else.124
B. As Strategy and Rhetoric
All of this suggests moving beyond the blunt formalist-functionalist divide in assessing Supreme Court opinions related to foreign afBanco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
Id. at 423.
118 Id. at 430–33.
119 Id. at 432 (“The dangers of such adjudication are present regardless of whether the
State Department has, as it did in this case, asserted that the relevant act violated international
law.”).
120 Id. at 436 (“[A] reversal of the Bernstein principle would work serious inroads on the
maximum effectiveness of United States diplomacy.”). This is not to say that the resulting opinion and doctrine do not in some sense favor the Executive, but rather that whether it does or
does not is a complicated question on which different observers might disagree.
121 W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
122 Id. at 405–06.
123 A similar account might be told regarding Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). See
infra note 152 and accompanying text.
124 One might question the value of looking at all of these doctrinal areas together. The
Court though has long treated them as a category, justifying its functionalism in all of them with
the same concerns—the delicateness of foreign affairs, the unusual need for one voice, and the
relative expertise of the federal government.
116
117
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fairs. Far more telling than the overall trend towards formalism is
how the Court makes decisions about what is part of that trend and
what is not. Which doctrines and contexts does the Court look at
functionally or formally? Who does the Court’s functionalism or formalism favor? Is functionalism or formalism used primarily in contexts where functionalism might favor the executive branch? If so,
this might suggest a particular view of the Court, good or bad, with
regard to Executive power. Is functionalism used instead across the
board with regard to a wide range of different issues and contexts?
Does it always favor the Executive, or even the political branches?
The same questions can be asked of a Court’s use of formalist techniques. In what cases does it appear to carry weight? Who does the
Court’s formalism seem to constrain: the Executive, Congress, the
courts, or individual plaintiffs?
One possibility is that the Court’s use of functionalism is actually
a means of empowering itself. In an earlier important article, Jack
Goldsmith, looking primarily at the Court’s opinions in cases involving doctrines of political question, act of state, and dormant foreign
affairs preemption, argued that the Court had over a period of time
adopted a functionalist “foreign relations effects” test that left federal
judges to decide whether a particular case was good or bad for American foreign policy.125 In that article, he also identified a potential new
trend back to formalism, which he welcomed as a way to return foreign policy effects questions back to the political branches.126 The opposite, though, may also be true. While formalism might favor the
political branches, as Goldsmith suggested, it may also empower the
courts (or at the very least the Supreme Court). This is arguably the
case with the Roberts Court, as the next Part will explain.127
The point is that depending on exactly how functionalism and formalism are arrayed, different stories can be told about the Court’s
goals and philosophy. In other words, the nuance matters.
It is also important to recognize that while particular decisions
are often labeled “functionalist” or “formalist,” the reality is that the
lines between the two approaches can be quite fuzzy.128 Formalism
and functionalism are constructs; few opinions fit perfectly into either.
Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 1417.
Id. at 1424.
127 See infra Part II.B.6.
128 See Eskridge, Jr., supra note 70, at 24 (stating that “constitutional reasoning pervasively,
and often unconsciously, melds formalist and functionalist justifications); see also Pearlstein,
supra note 105, at 844–46.
125
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Many opinions will invoke both in support of their result,129 and observers might reasonably disagree about how a particular opinion
should be categorized.130 Take Munaf v. Geren,131 for example. In
that case, a unanimous Court held that the habeas statute applied to
two American citizens held by U.S. forces operating as part of a multinational coalition in Iraq.132 In one sense, the decision sounds quite
formalistic, focusing on the habeas statute’s plain language, which applies to anyone held “in custody” of the United States.133 In another
sense, the opinion might be read as a functionalist one, rejecting the
U.S. government’s formalist argument that the two men were held not
by the United States, but by Multinational Forces-Iraq, a U.N.-sanctioned coalition.134 Functionally, the Court held, the two men were
under the complete control of the United States, regardless of the label under which the United States was operating.135 This is even
before getting into the opinion’s second half, which declares habeas
“governed by equitable principles,”136 denies the relief requested, and
suggests broad deference to the Executive in transfer decisions.137 Or
take the Court’s recent decision in Kiobel.138 As will be discussed
more below, the application of a presumption against extraterritoriality to claims under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”)139 seems like a formalist move, applying a bright-line rule of statutory interpretation
rather than a more searching analysis of what Congress might have
129 See Eskridge, Jr., supra note 70, at 24 (listing examples). A good example from the
foreign affairs canon is United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Often
cited for its highly functional support for Executive discretion in foreign affairs, Justice Sutherland’s opinion also invokes formal sources like history and text in support of his position. Id. at
316–19. Similarly, Hamilton’s Pacificus writings during the Neutrality crisis invoke both functional accounts of the President’s primacy in diplomatic affairs and formal accounts of the Vesting Clause of Article II of the Constitution. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, PACIFICUS NO. 1 (1793),
reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33, 36–40 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E.
Cooke eds., 1969).
130 Even that opus of functionalism, Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence, see supra text accompanying notes 86–98, plays some formalist notes: “With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the
Executive be under the law . . . .” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 655
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
131 Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008).
132 See id. at 678–80.
133 Id. at 686.
134 Id. at 685–86.
135 Id. at 686–88.
136 Id. at 693 (internal quotation marks omitted).
137 Id. at 702.
138 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
139 Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
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intended or might now want. That said, application of the presumption in this case invites a range of functionalist analyses about when
and whether a particular claim touches or concerns the territory of the
United States in a significant enough way to overcome it.140
This brings us to an important point: instead of trying to characterize a decision as formalist or functionalist, we might better talk of
formalist or functionalist rhetoric.141 It is common for commentators
to talk about formalism and functionalism as if they were interpretative rules, often arguing for one or the other because it will more often
than not lead to a particular desired or desirable set of outcomes.142
140 Not to mention the Court’s admittedly unusual, see Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664–69, application of the presumption against extraterritoriality to particular claims rather than to the regulatory scope of the statute, a transposition that seems inspired by the Court’s functionalist
concerns about how the Alien Tort Statute works. See infra Part II.B.4. It should also be noted
that formalist rhetoric and technique may also be a smokescreen for functionalist thinking. See
infra notes 329–32 and accompanying text.

As will be explained, understanding formalism and functionalism as rhetoric can help
explain how the Roberts Court’s decisions can be formalist yet favor the courts. See infra Part
II.B. Although invoking the language and technique of formalism, many of the Roberts Court
decisions adopt “rules” whose content or application remains obscure or novel. See, e.g., Wuerth, supra note 25, at 1–3 (explaining that though the Medellı́n opinion “reads in places like a
breath of formalist fresh air,” upon closer examination it creates a lack of clarity and generates
tensions with formalism). Criticism that the Court’s formalist tests are obscure or novel is common. See, e.g., David J. Bederman, Medellı́n’s New Paradigm for Treaty Interpretation, 102 AM.
J. INT’L L. 529, 530 (2008) (arguing “the Medellı́n decision signifies a substantial break with
previous disputations between members of the Supreme Court as to the proper modalities of
treaty interpretation, and fashions a new paradigm for treaty construction with respect to three
essential matters”); Anthony J. Colangelo, Kiobel: Muddling the Distinction Between Prescriptive and Adjudicative Jurisdiction, 28 MD. J. INT’L L. 65, 65–66 (2013) (criticizing the Court’s
novel use of the presumption against extraterritoriality); David L. Sloss, Executing Foster v.
Neilson: The Two-Step Approach to Analyzing Self-Executing Treaties, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 135,
186–87 (2012) (describing Medellı́n as “inscrutable,” “analytically incoherent,” and reliant on a
“fictitious” basis); Marco Ventoruzzo, Like Moths to a Flame? International Securities Litigation
After Morrison: Correcting the Supreme Court’s “Transactional Test,” 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 405, 410
(2012) (explaining that “the transactional test adopted by the majority is profoundly ambiguous
and might cause uncertainties in its application”). The result is that much like the functionalist
“foreign effects test” that Goldsmith identifies, see supra note 26, at 1417, these “rules” leave
lower courts a great deal of discretion to shape their contours.

R

141

142 See, e.g., Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional
Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 154–56 [hereinafter Ku & Yoo,
Beyond Formalism] (using functional arguments to propose a system in which “courts would
continue to adjudicate [customary international law (CIL)] cases, while at the same time allowing a functionally superior executive branch to oversee and unify the interpretation of CIL
when necessary”); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign
Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 180, 199 (2006) (arguing
the Supreme Court should have deferred to executive interpretation in Hamdan for functional
reasons as the “federal judiciary suffers significant disadvantages” in resolving issues in foreign
affairs); Deborah N. Pearlstein, Form and Function in the National Security Constitution, 41
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But as explained above and described below, neither formalism nor
functionalism dictates outcomes in particular cases. Cases are simply
too complex, with too many elements that could be seen through a
formalist or functionalist lens.
Instead, formalism and functionalism should more properly be
seen as rhetorical moves that can be used to justify a particular decision and set a particular tone or mood. As such, in analyzing the formalism or functionalism of particular opinions, it is language and
rhetoric on which we should be focusing: when does the Court invoke
the binds of formal categories, clear language, or formal rules, and
when does it break free of them, citing the obvious needs of a functioning government? It is the use of such competing rhetorics that
most clearly distinguishes the opinions of the Souter and Roberts
Courts discussed in the next section.
Suggesting that formalism and functionalism are primarily rhetorical is not to suggest that the categories are unimportant. On the contrary, rhetoric can have real force, framing arguments between the
Justices and serving as part of a broader attempt to justify the Court’s
opinions to its various audiences, the political branches, lower courts,
and the public. An effective shift in rhetoric can change the terms of
debates between members of the Court and others, even if it does not
dictate outcomes. Depending on the prevailing mood, Justices may
want (or need) to justify opinions as either sufficiently constraining or
sufficiently aware of practical realities. When functionalism is dominant and the mood favors deferring to the political branches, a decision constraining the Executive may need to sound in functionalism
and signal an awareness of real world complexities. Justice
O’Connor’s functionalist opinion in Hamdi denying the President a
“blank check”143 on matters of national security might be an example.144 If, as argued in the next Part, formalism now dominates and
gives voice to a mood of distrust and constraint, we might expect Justices to cautiously suggest limits even when they uphold the general
discretion of other actors. It should not be surprising that Justice
Breyer was searching for a limiting reading of the Chemical Weapons
Convention Implementation Act in the Bond oral argument,145 nor
CONN. L. REV. 1549, 1553 (2009) (arguing against the new functionalists’ “scattershot approach”
in separation of powers disputes).
143

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004).

144

See infra Part II.A.6.

Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) (No.
12-158). See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text.
145
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that the more liberal concurring Justices in Kiobel suggested new constraints on the Alien Tort Statute even as they argued against the
more formalist shackles on human rights litigation that the majority
put in place.146
II. THERE

AND

BACK AGAIN: THE “SOUTER”
ROBERTS COURTS

AND

The attraction of either formalist or functionalist approaches to
foreign affairs cases has waxed and waned over the course of American history.147 At some point in the twentieth century, though, functionalism gained the upper hand. One might look to Curtiss-Wright,
which found formalist domestic doctrines on nondelegation inapplicable to foreign affairs, as the start of this shift.148 That 1936 opinion laid
out the key functionalist justifications for greater political branch, and
particularly Executive, discretion in foreign affairs that would be cited
by later functionalist opinions, including the unique need for secrecy,
the President’s better knowledge of “conditions which prevail in foreign countries,”149 and the President’s access to information and
agents.150 Or one might date the birth of foreign affairs functionalism
to 1952 and Justice Jackson’s influential Youngstown concurrence.151
Still others might find the trend’s origin in the mid-1960s in cases like
Sabbatino and Zschernig v. Miller,152 which justified application of the
act of state doctrine and the preemption of state law (in the absence of
a specific federal act or treaty) in functionalist terms.153
This trend towards functionalism put foreign affairs law increasingly outside the mainstream of American law. The political question
doctrine, now rarely applied in other areas of law, is regularly, and
146 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1670–71 (2013) (Breyer, J.
concurring).
147 See INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 2
(David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., 2011) (mapping shifts in foreign
affairs jurisprudence over time).
148 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936).
149 Id. at 320
150 Id.
151 See supra notes 85–98 and accompanying text; see also Vladeck supra note 26, at 30–31
(describing Youngstown as the origin of the Court’s movement towards functionalism).
152 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
153 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440–41; Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
423–25 (1964); see also Goldsmith, supra note , at 1401–09. Goldsmith identifies this as the
beginning of the trend towards functionalism, adding Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and its
functionalist account of the political question doctrine to the mix. For Goldsmith, the functionalist story is one rooted in Cold War sensitivities about the potential peril associated with judicial
involvement in foreign policy.
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very loosely,154 used to shield foreign affairs from judicial scrutiny.155
Courts normally apply a presumption against preemption of state law,
but when foreign affairs are concerned, that presumption slips away or
may even be reversed.156 Deference will more quickly be granted to
the Executive in treaty interpretation than in the interpretation of ordinary statutes, where stricter canons of interpretation will be applied.
Presumptions against federal common law may not apply to foreign
affairs.157 Canons of statutory antiretroactivity will be loosened when
foreign affairs are at issue.158
Whatever the origin, the trend towards foreign affairs functionalism was established enough by the late 1990s that a series of more
formalist decisions by the Supreme Court seemed sufficiently extraordinary to some observers to augur a new trend. Observers
pointed to Environmental Tectonics,159 adopting a rule-based approach to the act of state doctrine, Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise
Tax Board,160 rejecting preemption of a California tax with foreign
relations implications, EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,161 applying a presumption against extraterritoriality to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,162 and possibly Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American
Cetacean Society,163 refusing to abstain from the case on political question grounds, as a potential “new formalism” in foreign affairs law.164
See infra Part II.B.7.
See Goldsmith, supra note , at 1403.
156 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501–02 (2012) (finding an Arizona statute granting itself “independent authority to prosecute federal registration violations” was preempted by a federal law governing alien registration); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67–68
(1941) (“[I]t is of importance that [Pennsylvania’s] legislation is in a field which affects international relations, the one aspect of our government . . . most generally conceded imperatively to
demand broad national authority.”); see also Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 188.
157 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726 (2004); Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (identifying “international disputes implicating . . . our
relations with foreign nations” as appropriate for federal common law); Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at
427.
158 See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 696 (2004).
159 W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
160 Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
161 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
162 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
163 Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986); see also Goldsmith,
supra note , at 1427–28 (expressing uncertainty about whether the case was part of a formalist
shift).
164 See Goldsmith, supra note , at 1427–28; see also Spiro, supra note 25 (“Barclays Bank v.
Franchise Tax Board (1994) was a case that some of us (those who started teaching in the mid
154
155
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If that formalism was a trend, it was not meant to last.165 By the
early to mid-2000s, functionalism was back, arguably stronger than
ever. At the center of this robust functionalism was Justice Souter.
Although he did not author all of the functionalist opinions during this
period, his opinions announced the Court’s functionalism in the
strongest terms and epitomize the functionalism that prevailed. Three
key Justice Souter-authored decisions set the general tone: Crosby,
Garamendi, and Sosa.
A. The Functionalist “Souter Court”
1. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council
In Crosby, the Court considered a Massachusetts law that sought
to ban state entities from contracting with those doing business with
the military regime then running Burma.166 In a Justice Souter-authored majority opinion, the Court invalidated the law, finding it preempted by the similar sanctions adopted by Congress a few months
later.167 From a formal standpoint, there might have seemed little reason to preempt the Massachusetts law. The Congressional legislation
said nothing about state sanctions,168 both seemed inspired by the
same goal,169 and there was no direct conflict between the laws’ requirements.170 Nonetheless, the Court found that the Massachusetts
law stood as an “obstacle” to the federal one.171 Justice Souter specifically avoided stating a formal rule—either a presumption for or
against preemption.172 Instead, the key to his decision was his belief
that Congress, in enacting its legislation, had made very intentional
and careful decisions about the scope and type of sanctions that would
be wise.173 Functionally, the fact that the Massachusetts act banned
transactions not banned by Congress “undermine[d] the Congres90s) saw as a breakthrough case on foreign relations federalism, a sharp turn from Zschernig and
the ‘one voice’ line of foreign commerce clause cases.”).
165 Ironically though, it is plausible that Goldsmith’s influential article recognizing the earlier shift did have legs, planting some of the seeds for the current shift. See generally Goldsmith,
supra note .
166 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
167 Id. at 388.
168 See id. at 376 n.10.
169 See id. at 379.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 385.
172 Id. at 374 n.8 (2000) (“We leave for another day a consideration in this context of a
presumption against preemption.”).
173 Id. at 377–78 (“Congress’s calibrated Burma policy is a deliberate effort to ‘steer a middle path.’ ”).
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sional calibration of force.”174 Moreover, the congressional act required the President to develop a “comprehensive, multilateral
strategy”175 to achieve democracy and human rights in Burma, and it
granted the President discretion to suspend the sanctions under certain circumstances.176 Massachusetts’s sanctions, which the President
could not waive, limited the President’s diplomatic tools.177 As Justice
Souter explained, “[i]t is not merely that the differences between the
state and federal Acts in scope and type of sanctions threaten to complicate discussions; they compromise the very capacity of the President to speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other
governments.”178
2. American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi
Garamendi, just three years later, took the functionalist case for
foreign affairs preemption even further. In that case, the Court was
forced to consider a California law that required “any insurer doing
business in that State to disclose information about all policies sold in
Europe between 1920 and 1945.”179 Unlike Crosby, however, there
was no federal law that might preempt it. Instead, the issue was
whether an Executive agreement between President Clinton and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, creating a compensation fund for
individuals whose insurance policies had been confiscated or denied as
a result of Nazi policies, preempted the California law.180 In the
agreement, the United States agreed to encourage use of the fund’s
settlement procedures as the “exclusive forum” for Holocaust-related
claims against German companies.181 Justice Souter, again writing for
the majority, found that the California law had been preempted because it “interfer[ed] with the National Government’s conduct of foreign relations.”182 “California [sought] to use an iron fist where the
President has consistently chosen kid gloves,”183 Justice Souter explained. Again, functionalist justifications seemed to carry the day:
174

Id. at 380.

175

Id.

176

See id. at 376 n.10.

177

See id. at 367, 381–82.

178

Id. at 381.

179

Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003).

180

See id. at 405–10.

181

Id. at 406.

182

Id. at 401.

183

Id. at 427.
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There is, of course, no question that at some point an exercise of state power that touches on foreign relations must
yield to the National Government’s policy, given the ‘concern for uniformity in this country’s dealings with foreign nations’ that animated the Constitution’s allocation of the
foreign relations power to the National Government in the
first place.184
3. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
In contrast with Garamendi, Sosa’s functionalism comes in a different context and takes a different form. In Sosa, the Supreme Court
was faced with the scope and meaning of the Alien Tort Statute.185 A
key question for the Court was whether the statute was merely jurisdictional or whether it granted courts the authority to recognize
causes of action for law of nations violations.186 Rejecting either rule,
Justice Souter set out a middle ground: the statute is jurisdictional, but
was enacted against a background assumption that courts would hear
claims regarding the few law of nations violations then recognized at
common law.187 This led Justice Souter to a functionalist standard for
whether a particular cause of action can today be recognized under
the statute: “any claim based on the present-day law of nations” must
“rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized
world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the
18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”188 Functionalist concerns support this “restrained conception of the [federal courts’] discretion . . . in considering a new cause of action.”189 Understandings
of the common law and the role of courts had changed since the ATS
was enacted in 1789,190 and Congress had neither granted the courts a
mandate to recognize new causes of action under international law
nor explicitly created private rights of action.191 More broadly, “the
Id. at 413 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964)).
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.”).
186 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713–14 (2004).
187 See id. at 714–15 (discussing the “narrow set of violations . . . that was probably on
minds of the men who drafted with ATS”).
188 Id. at 725. Those eighteenth-century paradigms were “violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.” Id. at 724.
189 Id. at 725.
190 Id. at 729–30 (“[P]ost-Erie understanding has identified limited enclaves in which federal courts may derive some substantive law in a common law way.”).
191 Id. at 718.
184
185
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potential implications for the foreign relations of the United States of
recognizing such causes should make courts particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in
managing foreign affairs.”192 But for Justice Souter, the functional
considerations do not end there.193 For example, a requirement that
plaintiffs exhaust their remedies in other countries’ courts before using the ATS might be appropriate in certain cases.194 There may also
be some room for “case-specific deference to the political branches”
where they express a view on a particular case.195
The functionalism of these decisions was not lost on those Justices
dissenting or concurring in Garamendi and Sosa.196 “As I see it,” Justice Ginsburg wrote in dissent in Garamendi, “courts step out of their
proper role when they rely on no legislative or even executive text,
but only on inference and implication, to preempt state laws on foreign affairs grounds.”197 “The displacement of state law by preemption properly requires a considerably more formal and binding federal
instrument.”198 And in his concurrence in Sosa, Justice Scalia excoriated the majority for its “Never Say Never Jurisprudence,”199 its “discretion-based framework,”200 and its invitation to “ambitious lower
courts”201 to embark on an “illegitimate lawmaking endeavor,”202 as
well as for ignoring a range of formal rules designed to limit judicial
lawmaking in the absence of congressional authorization.203
192 Id. at 727. Notably, Justice Scalia saw the same factors as reasons for a formal approach, one that would require Congress to act before courts recognized any cause of action
based on international law. Id. at 747 (Scalia, J., concurring).
193 See id. at 733 n.21 (majority opinion) (“This requirement of clear definition is not meant
to be the only principle limiting the availability of relief in the federal courts for violations of
customary international law . . . .”).
194

Id.

195

Id.

There was no dissent in Crosby. Justices Scalia and Thomas did add a concurrence
taking issue with majority’s use of legislative history (itself, arguably a form of functionalism) to
inform its understanding of Congress’s purpose. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S.
363, 388–91 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
196

197

Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 443 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

198

Id. at 442.

199

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 750 (Scalia, J., concurring).

200

Id. at 746.

201

Id. at 750.

202

Id.

Id. at 739–47. It is hard to overstate Justice Scalia’s alarm that the majority has loosened the Constitution’s restraints on the Court. He describes the path as “perilous.” Id. at 749.
“The Framers would . . . be appalled.” Id. at 750. “[U]nelected federal judges,” he writes, are
“usurping . . . lawmaking power” from the people’s representatives. Id.
203
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But those three cases are not alone. The foreign affairs functionalism obvious in the three cases was pervasive during this period,
reaching its height in the 2003 Term. Functionalist approaches
seemed ascendant in every foreign affairs-related case before the
Court. Aside from Sosa, Altmann, Empagran, Hamdi, and Rasul v.
Bush204 each show varying shades of functionalism.205
4. Republic of Austria v. Altmann
In Altmann, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held that
the presumption against retroactivity did not apply to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”).206 Even though there was no exception to immunity for “property taken in violation of international
law”207 prior to the FSIA’s enactment in 1976, Maria Altmann could
nonetheless use it to sue the Austrian Gallery for the alleged theft of
her family’s artwork in the 1940s.208 As Justice Stevens explained, an
antiretroactivity presumption protects those who may have relied on
the prior legal rule209:
But the principal purpose of foreign sovereign immunity has
never been to permit foreign states and their instrumentalities to shape their conduct in reliance on the promise of future immunity from suit in United States courts. Rather,
such immunity reflects current political realities and relationships, and aims to give foreign states and their instrumentalities some present “protection from the inconvenience of suit
as a gesture of comity.”210
Justice Breyer’s concurrence (joined by Justice Souter) put an exclamation point on the majority’s functionalist reasoning, ridiculing
the idea that “the expropriations carried out by the Nazi or Communist regimes” were influenced “by knowledge of, or speculation about,
the likely future shape of America’s law of foreign sovereign immunity” as approaching “the realm of fantasy.”211
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
One could even add in here a case like Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542
U.S. 241 (2004). In that case, the Court understood the terms “interested person” and “foreign
tribunal” functionally, based on a careful assessment of how complaints to the European Commission work and how Congress would have hoped they would be categorized. Id. at 256–59.
206 Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 699–700 (2004); see Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602–1611 (2012).
207 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
208 Altmann, 541 U.S. at 700.
209 Id. at 678.
210 Id. at 696 (quoting Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 479 (2003)).
211 Id. at 711 (Breyer, J., concurring).
204
205
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5. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S.A.
Faced with the scope of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (“FTAIA”),212 Justice Breyer framed the question before
the Court: “Why is it reasonable to apply this law to conduct that is
significantly foreign insofar as that conduct causes independent foreign
harm and that foreign harm alone gives rise to the plaintiff’s claim?”213
“We can find no good answer to the question,”214 he answered. In
some ways, the result looks quite similar to that achieved by the application of the much more formal presumption against extraterritoriality later applied by the Roberts Court in Morrison and Kiobel.215 But
the logic and rhetoric is highly functionalist. Seemingly moved by the
many amicus briefs submitted by offended foreign states,216 the decision invokes “principles of prescriptive comity.”217 As the Court explained, “if America’s antitrust policies could not win their own way
in the international marketplace for such ideas, Congress, we must
assume, would not have tried to impose them, in an act of legal imperialism, through legislative fiat.”218 The functionalism of this analysis
is highlighted by Justice Scalia’s concurrence, which argues for the result on the sole basis of the presumption against extraterritoriality, a
more formal path to the same place.219
6. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
In Hamdi, Justice O’Connor, writing for a plurality of the Court,
found Congress’s Authorization for Use of Military Force
(“AUMF”)220 sufficient authority for the President to hold an American citizen captured in Afghanistan as an enemy combatant.221 Although the AUMF did not specifically mention detention, and another
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012).
F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 166 (2004).
214 Id.
215 See infra Parts II.B.3–4.
216 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 167–68 (citing briefs of the governments of Canada, Germany,
and Japan).
217 Id. at 169.
218 Id.; cf. William S. Dodge, Loose Canons: International Law and Statutory Interpretation
in the Twenty-First Century, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, supra note
147, at 547, 548–49 (describing a Breyer-Ginsburg approach to resolving cross-boundary regulatory conflicts that focuses on the functionalist-sounding “legitimate sovereign interests”).
219 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 176 (Scalia, J., concurring).
220 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2012)).
221 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
212
213

R
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prior statute, the Non-Detention Act,222 required Congressional authorization for the detention of American citizens, Congress did authorize the use of “all necessary and appropriate force.”223 As “[t]he
capture and detention of lawful combatants and the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by universal agreement and
practice, are important incidents of war,”224 functionally Congress
must have intended to activate those powers in enacting the AUMF.
Notably, Justice O’Connor avoided multiple formal rules that could
have decided the case in different ways. She avoided the Bush Administration’s formal argument that the Constitution’s designation of
the President as Commander-in-Chief gave the President this power
exclusively and on his own.225 She also rejected both Justices Scalia
and Stevens’s position that only treason could be used to try or detain
American citizens without suspension of the writ of habeas corpus226
and Justices Souter and Ginsburg’s position that only a clear statement by Congress could authorize detention under or supersede the
Non-Detention Act.227
That authorization to detain, however, was “not a blank check for
the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”228
Detainees are due some process to challenge their designation and
detention.229 How much process, O’Connor explained, will require
balancing functional concerns: the detainee’s “interest in being free
from physical detention by one’s own government”230 and “the
weighty and sensitive governmental interests in ensuring that those
who have in fact fought with the enemy during a war do not return to
battle against the United States.”231 The result is that
222

Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2012).

223

AUMF § 2(a), 115 Stat. at 224.

224

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

225

See id. at 516–17.

226

Id. at 523–24.

Id. at 544 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter does acknowledge the executive
branch’s more functionalist arguments for presidential authority, but finds that the President’s
claimed authority to detain Hamdi goes beyond even what Justice Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence might allow and that while in a “moment of genuine emergency, when the Government
must act with no time for deliberation, the Executive may be able to detain a citizen if there is
reason to fear he is an imminent threat to the safety of the Nation and its people,” no such
emergency is present in this case. Id. at 552. Justice Souter’s response to this functionalist logic
demonstrates how much sway it held over the Court during this period.
227

228

Id. at 536 (majority opinion).

229

Id. at 536–37.

230

Id. at 529.

231

Id. at 531.
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while the full protections that accompany challenges to detentions in other settings may prove unworkable and inappropriate in the enemy-combatant setting, the threats to
military operations posed by a basic system of independent
review are not so weighty as to trump a citizen’s core rights
to challenge meaningfully the Government’s case and to be
heard by an impartial adjudicator.232
7. Rasul v. Bush
The main holding in Rasul v. Bush did not necessarily turn on
functionalist considerations. Justice Stevens’s majority opinion that
the habeas statute applied to detainees at Guantanamo Bay turned
more on a careful reading of statutory language and zigzagging
caselaw.233 Where functionalism does come up is in his analysis of
whether the presumption against extraterritoriality should bar application of the statute to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, specifically. There,
Justice Stevens found the presumption inapplicable, as “the United
States exercises complete jurisdiction and control over the Guantanamo Base, and may continue to do so permanently if it so
chooses,”234 “formal notions of territorial sovereignty”235 notwithstanding. Presaging the Court’s opinion in Boumediene, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence much more explicitly embraces functionalism,
adopting a test for habeas jurisdiction based on how much control the
United States has over Guantanamo Bay and how much process the
detainees have already been given, together with considerations of
military necessity.236

232

Id. at 535.

Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 475–79 (2004). Compare Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct., 410
U.S. 484, 494–95 (1973) (“So long as the custodian can be reached by service of process, the
court can issue a writ within its jurisdiction . . . even if the prisoner himself is confined outside
the court’s territorial jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 (1950) (“We are cited to no instance where a court . . . has issued [a writ
of habeas corpus] on behalf of an alien enemy who, at no relevant time and in no stage of his
captivity, has been within its territorial jurisdiction.”), and Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 192
(1948) (“[T]he jurisdiction of the District Court to issue the writ [of habeas corpus] is restricted
to those petitioners who are confined or detained within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
233

234

Rasul, 542 U.S. at 467–68.

235

Id. at 482.

236

Id. at 485–88 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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8. Functionalism’s Philosophy
Individually, the functionalism of these decisions has been interpreted in different ways. Garamendi has often been interpreted as an
endorsement of strong Executive authority, Crosby as a victory for
federal exclusivity and a defeat for state experimentation, and Sosa as
a guarded victory for human rights plaintiffs.237 Aside from their functionalism, is there any coherent philosophy animating all of these Souter Court cases?
One thing that should be immediately clear is that the functionalism of the Souter Court cases does not necessarily favor the Executive—a typical description of foreign affairs functionalism.238
Although a case like Garamendi clearly and dramatically does, Rasul
certainly does not. Other cases are more complicated. In both Sosa239
and Altmann,240 the Court specifically chose not to adopt the more
formal rule suggested by the executive branch.241 Nonetheless, in both
cases, the Court seemed quite sensitive to the executive branch’s concerns and quite ready to give the Executive a powerful say over how
individual cases will be handled.242 Thus, in Sosa, Justice Souter
opened the door to “case-specific deference to the political
branches,”243 an idea that seems to have echoes of Garamendi. And in
Altmann, Justice Stevens suggested that “should the State Department
choose to express its opinion on the implications of exercising jurisdiction over particular petitioners in connection with their alleged conduct, that opinion might well be entitled to deference as the
considered judgment of the Executive on a particular question of foreign policy.”244
See generally Ku & Yoo, Beyond Formalism, supra note 142.
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
239 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 723 (2004) (rejecting “Sosa’s argument that
legislation conferring a right of action is needed”).
240 Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701 (2004) (rejecting “the United States’
recommendation to bar application of the FSIA to claims based on pre-enactment conduct”); id.
(“While the United States’ views on such an issue are of considerable interest to the Court, they
merit no special deference.”).
241 See Harlan Grant Cohen, Supremacy and Diplomacy: The International Law of the U.S.
Supreme Court, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 273, 316–18 (2006).
242 It should also be noted that in Sosa, the Executive “wins” the case. The majority found
against Alvarez-Machain on his claim, one that was, even if indirectly, a challenge to the Executive’s actions. There is also a possibility that the rule announced in that case, that a one-day
detention was not a cognizable customary international law claim, was made with an eye towards
the situation described in Rasul. See Cohen, supra note 241, at 288 n.84.
243 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21.
244 Altmann, 541 U.S. at 702.
237
238

R
R

R
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Nor is it clear that functionalism favors plaintiffs. It did in Altmann, allowing Maria Altmann to sue regarding conduct arising
before the passage of the FSIA, and it might have in Sosa,245 but perhaps not as much as a formal rule in favor of incorporating customary
international law more broadly. Functionalism certainly did not favor
plaintiffs in Empagran.246
Instead, the philosophy (or impulse) behind the Souter Court’s
functionalism seems more complex. For the Souter Court, the three
branches are not in opposition—they are working together. The
Court’s functionalist decisions seem to envision the three federal
branches in partnership, cooperating to manage the nation’s foreign
affairs. Again, the three key Justice Souter-authored decisions tell
much of the story. One consistent part of the trend is that states fare
badly. This seems to be the lesson of Crosby and Garamendi. Only
the federal government—whether the executive branch, Congress, or
the courts—has the necessary expertise and judgment to manage the
international implications of modern governance. Adding Sosa to the
equation adds nuance. In Crosby and Garamendi, the Court’s job is
to give Congress and the executive branch, its partners, room to work.
The Court’s language in each decision emphasizes the federal government’s carefully chosen and highly calibrated policies247 and the importance of allowing those policies to follow their course. In Sosa,
though, the policy of the federal government seems less clear. In that
case at least, the executive branch sought to narrow the ATS.248 Congress, though, may have originally intended the ATS to have teeth in
at least some cases and had seemingly (and approvingly) acquiesced
to the litigation experiment over the prior twenty years.249 Rather
than cut off the experiment as the Executive had suggested, the Court
chose to let it run its course, although with ample space for the Executive to express its views in specific cases. The assumption seems to be
that Congress has the power to change the game if it so wishes250 and
245 Though, of course, Sosa’s approach failed to help the specific plaintiff in that case,
whose claim failed to meet Sosa’s standard of specificity, universality, or obligation. See Cohen,
supra note , at 286–88.
246 See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 159 (2004) (holding
that the domestic-injury exception to the FTAIA “does not apply where the plaintiff’s claim” is
based exclusively on “independent foreign harm”).
247 See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 425 (2003); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 377–79 (2000).
248 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712; see also Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting
Petitioner at 11–20, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339).
249 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 730–31.
250 This seems to be the point in Crosby of emphasizing congressional silence on the issue.
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the President should be able to protect his foreign policy through
statements of interest. In the absence of either, the Court will try to
protect and fulfill current policy, managing both it and the relations
between the branches. The Court’s decisions are, in its estimation,
designed to help the branches work together.
Globalization, for the Souter Court, is an exciting opportunity,
but also complicated and a little bit dangerous. Managing the United
States’s relationship with globalization requires subtlety, diplomacy,
and experimentation. The foreign affairs functionalism of the Souter
Court seems designed to enable those goals, creating space for the
three branches to manage and tweak these processes over time. The
functionalism of each of the decisions operates to keep space open for
policies to play out, rather than cut them off. Thus the President’s
negotiating room is protected in Crosby and Garamendi;251 the “door
is still ajar”252 for ATS claims in Sosa; the Commander-in-Chief has
some leeway in the detention of enemy combatants in Hamdi;253 plaintiffs can generally bring old claims against foreign state entities in Altmann;254 and the extraterritorial application of laws will be measured
against prescriptive comity in Empagran.255 At the same time, the
Court is careful to leave room for all three branches, particularly Congress and the President, to change policies when necessary: Crosby is
careful to rely on perceived congressional intent, leaving it open to
Congress to authorize state legislation like Massachusetts’s;256
Garamendi emphasizes that Congress has not spoken on the question
(but could);257 Sosa, Altmann, and Hamdi all leave room for the Executive to tweak policies at the edges;258 and Rasul, Sosa, Altmann, and
Empagran all rely on statutes and congressional intent,259 seemingly
inviting Congress to chime in with legislation if it disagrees.
In the absence of congressional recognition that federal and state law conflict, the Court may
still assume that Congress is in favor of preemption. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 387–88.
251

See supra notes 172–84 and accompanying text.

252

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729.

253

See supra Part II.A.4.

254

See supra Part II.A.5.

255

See supra notes 206–14 and accompanying text.

See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373–74 (2000) (holding that the
state law is unconstitutional on the basis that it undermines congressional objectives).
256

257

Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 429 (2003).

See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 533–34 (2004); Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701–02 (2004).
258

259 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727–28; Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 472–75 (2004); F. HoffmannLa Roche Ltd v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169–70 (2004); Altmann, 541 U.S. at 694–99.
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There is thus an optimism to these decisions—a belief that experimentation leads to positive outcomes and that the three branches can
and do work together. It is a philosophy of partnership, management,
and facilitation.
B. Roberts Court Formalism
This optimism, though, may have been short lived. Starting with
Hamdan in 2006, and carrying through Medellı́n, Morrison, Zivotofsky, Mohamad, Kiobel, Daimler AG v. Bauman,260 and Bond, pessimism and formalism started to creep into the Court’s views.261 These
experiments with globalization might not always produce positive results; the three branches may not be willing or able to work together.
The first clouds of this pessimism can be spotted in Hamdi.262
Justice O’Connor’s functionalist opinion only garnered a plurality,
with four politically disparate Justices in Scalia, Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg expressing concern over the power the Executive had
claimed.
1. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
The combination of pessimism and formalism first won a majority
of the Court in Hamdan. In that case, the Court was faced with the
validity of the military commissions established by the President to try
detainees at Guantanamo Bay.263 Had the Court applied some of the
functionalist tests it had previously used in such cases, it might have
upheld the commissions. As Justice Thomas’s dissent demonstrates,
functionalist readings of the Commander-in-Chief power in decisions
like The Prize Cases264 suggest that the President has “broad constitutional authority to protect the Nation’s security in the manner he
deems fit”265 and that he is afforded great deference on questions regarding the scope and duration of the conflict.266 Hamdi held that
“trial of unlawful combatants” was an “ ‘important incident[ ] of
war,’ ”267 triggered by Congress’s authorization of the use of “necesDaimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
Notably, although Justice Souter remained on the Court until 2009, Justice Souter-authored majorities, so noticeable before, seem to disappear at 2004.
262 See discussion supra notes 221–32 and accompanying text.
263 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006).
264 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
265 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 679 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
266 Id. at 679, 684.
267 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28
(1942)).
260
261

R
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sary and appropriate force.”268 Under Justice Thomas’s reading of
Justice Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence, the President was acting
either in the face of congressional silence or with its approval, and
thus due great deference.269 The President’s reading of the Geneva
Conventions was due traditional deference,270 as were the Executive’s
arguments for diverging from the traditional procedures of courtsmartial.271 To top it all off, Justice Thomas threw in the oft-stated
functional argument for presidential primacy in foreign affairs: “the
decisiveness, activity, secrecy, and dispatch that flow from the Executive’s unity.”272
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, did not go down this
route. Instead of focusing on why functionally it would be a good or
bad idea to allow the President to establish military commissions, Justice Stevens focused on what Congress had already formally done.
Regardless of whether the President might have the constitutional authority to establish commissions on his own (an issue specifically not
taken up),273 Congress had spoken with regard to them, authorizing
them through Article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(“UCMJ”).274 This put the situation in Justice Jackson’s third category.275 But giving a formalist twist to Justice Jackson’s concurrence,
Justice Stevens cited Youngstown for the proposition that “[w]hether
or not the President has independent power, absent congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not disregard
limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers.”276 Gone is Jackson’s famous ambiguity or
any of the room for constitutional “math.”277
It is against Congress’s limited authorization, then, that the President’s commissions must be assessed. For a plurality of the Court, this
Id.
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 679 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 581
(Thomas, J., dissenting)).
270 Id. at 719.
271 Id. at 713.
272 Id. at 679 (internal quotation marks omitted).
273 Id. at 592 (majority opinion).
274 See 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2012).
275 See supra notes 85–98 and accompanying text.
276 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 593 n.23 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
277 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637–38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (explaining that in the
third category, the President “can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control
in such a case only be disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.”).
268
269
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had implications both for the specific charges brought against
Hamdan—which the plurality found to be beyond those authorized by
the common law of war278—and the procedures laid down by the President’s order—which the plurality found violated “the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”279
For the majority, the latter—procedure—was the real problem. First,
explained Justice Stevens, Article 36(b) of the UCMJ requires that the
rules for all military trials be “uniform insofar as practicable.”280 The
majority found that the President had not made a sufficient showing
that applying the rules of courts-martial in these military commissions
would be impracticable, nor in turn, that the military commission’s
changes in hearsay rules or the defendant’s ability to be present were
justified.281 Second, the UCMJ authorized military commissions only
to the extent they complied with the law of war.282 Brushing aside the
President’s interpretation of the Geneva Conventions, the majority
found that Common Article 3 (“CA3”) of the Geneva Conventions
did apply to the conflict with Al Qaeda.283 Among other things, CA3
requires that all trials be before a “regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable
by civilized peoples.”284 Courts-martial are the regularly constituted
courts in the area; accordingly, wrote Justice Stevens, the military
commissions ordered by the President violated the Geneva Conventions and exceeded Congress’s authorization for military
commissions.285
The majority is also quite formalist in its reading of the Detainee
Treatment Act286—Congress’s response to the Court’s opinions in
Rasul and Hamdi.287 Section 1005(e)(1) of the Act orders that “no
court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider—
(1) an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 563.
Id. at 630 (quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention]).
280 Id. at 622 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2012)).
281 Id. at 623–24. Nor was the President due any special deference, as he is with regard to
Art. 36(a), which allowed him to diverge from the rules of the federal district courts “so far as he
considers practicable.” Id. at 622 (emphasis omitted); see 10 U.S.C. § 836.
282 Id. at 613.
283 Id. at 631–32.
284 Geneva Convention, supra note 279.
285 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 594, 625.
286 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680.
287 See, e.g., Ariel Meyerstein, The Law and Lawyers as Enemy Combatants, 18 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 299, 300 (2007) (contextualizing passage of the Detainee Treatment Act).
278
279
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an alien detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba.”288 A functionalist reading might have found that Congress
meant to foreclose habeas corpus for all Guantanamo detainees—a
response to the Court’s holding in Rasul that the habeas statute applied to Guantanamo Bay.289 The majority instead focused on the fact
that another section of the Act mentioned application to “pending”
cases.290 The absence of the same language in Section 1005(e)(1) suggested that it was not meant to apply to pending cases like the one
before them.291
Why the sudden shift to formalism? One part of the answer
seems obvious. The majority’s faith that the President is still part of
the federal team is dissipating. For the Justice Stevens-led plurality,
the President’s procedures violated “the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”292 Justice Kennedy
added his worries “that offenses will be defined, prosecuted, and adjudicated by executive officials without independent review,” putting
“personal liberty in peril of arbitrary action by officials.”293 Even at its
most functional, the Court was wary to give the Executive unfettered
control of foreign affairs law, rejecting on multiple occasions the executive branch’s view of the law.294 But even where it did defer to the
Executive, it did so with a faith that the Executive would not abuse
the discretion it had been given. For the majority in Hamdan, this
faith had clearly run out. If the President cannot be trusted with the
broad discretion granted by the Court, formal limits might be the only
answer.
But it is important to note also here the Court’s view of Congress.
The earlier functionalist decisions also seem to assume a Congress
willing to play its constitutional role and check the President effectively. Hamdan seems to suggest that that faith too is dissipating.
Seemingly worried that Congress is not taking habeas corpus seriously
enough, Hamdan requires Congress to be crystal clear if it wants to
remove the option entirely. Moreover, the concurrences’ strong invitations, even exhortations, to Congress to enter the fray and legislate
Detainee Treatment Act § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. at 2742.
A different formalist reading could also have foreclosed habeas corpus for all Guantanamo detainees, as Justice Scalia illustrates in his dissent. For Scalia, the “no court, justice, or
judge” language is “unambiguous[ ].” See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 655 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
290 Id. at 578–80 (majority opinion).
291 Id.
292 Id. at 633 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
293 Id. at 638 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
294 See supra notes 239–41 and accompanying text.
288
289
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on military commissions295 suggest that, in their view, Congress was
falling down on the job, all too willing to let the President take the
lead and the heat for hard national security decisions. The Souter
Court’s model of interbranch partnership seems to be breaking down,
or worse, corrupted.
Notably this formalism is not about judicial humility or taking the
courts out of foreign affairs decisions, as Goldsmith suggested it could
be.296 This version of formalism is about the Court reasserting control
and taming the political branches. It is the formalism of distrust.
2. Medellı́n v. Texas
Medellı́n, a decision with a very different majority, demonstrates
similar distrust. That case, part of a long-running saga over the rights
of foreign-national state criminal defendants to consult their consulates under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (“VCCR”),
raised two questions for the Court. First, how much force should be
given to a judgment of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) requiring the United States to give specific noncitizen death row inmates a hearing to see if they had been prejudiced by the failure to
inform them of their VCCR rights? Second, how much force should
be given to the President’s memorandum to Texas, ordering it to comply with the ICJ’s judgment?297
The first question raised the complicated issue of whether any of
the United States’s international commitments were or were not selfexecuting. Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,298 if
a treaty provision is self-executing it is immediately enforceable as
U.S. law, preempting any state law to the contrary.299 For Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, the question was not whether
the VCCR is self-executing, nor whether the Optional Protocol granting the ICJ jurisdiction over disputes is self-executing. Instead, the
relevant analysis was whether the United States’s commitment to
abide by ICJ judgments—enshrined in the U.N. Charter—is selfexecuting.300
295 Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Nothing prevents the President from returning to
Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary.”); id. at 637 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If
Congress, after due consideration, deems it appropriate to change the controlling statutes, in
conformance with the Constitution and other laws, it has the power and prerogative to do so.”).
296 See Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 1437.
297 Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498 (2008).
298 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
299 See Medellı́n, 552 U.S. at 504–505.
300 See id. at 507–11.
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Tests for self-execution developed in the lower courts had become notably functionalist, involving careful analysis of the intent of
the treaty-drafters and the function of the treaty.301 Chief Justice
Roberts adopted a much more formal approach. It is the language of
the treaty provision itself that matters.302 Where a treaty uses language implying immediate legal effect, words like “shall” or “must,” it
is self-executing.303 A requirement, however, that states “undertake[ ]
to comply”—the language of the U.N. Charter—seems to imply that
states must take some action before giving the provision domestic legal effect.304 Chief Justice Roberts accordingly found the requirement
to follow the ICJ judgment in question non-self-executing and therefore, on its own, not preemptive of Texas law.305
That still left the question of the President’s memorandum. To
what extent should it preempt Texas law? Under Garamendi, the
Souter Court precedent, the Court seemed quite ready to preempt
state law in favor of executive branch foreign policy concerns.306
Chief Justice Roberts, however, refused to grant such authority to the
President’s directive in this case. Again adopting a more formalist vision of Justice Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence, the majority explained that when the Senate gives its advice and consent to a nonself-executing treaty, it assumes that further congressional action will
be needed to give that treaty full domestic effect.307 When the President acts on his own to order the treaty implemented, he is acting
301 See Goldsmith, supra , at 1436; see also United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 877–84
(5th Cir. 1979) (applying a complicated multifactor analysis to determine whether a treaty provision is self-executing). As the dissenters in Medellı́n explain, this was not without good reason.
Different states have different constitutional rules about the domestic effect of international
treaties. As a result, finding a single answer to the self-execution question in the language of a
treaty, particularly a multilateral treaty, is unlikely. See Medellı́n, 552 U.S. at 549 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (describing the inquiry as “hunting the snark”).
302 Medellı́n, 552 U.S. at 506–07 (majority opinion) (“The interpretation of a treaty, like the
interpretation of a statute, begins with its text.”).
303 Id. at 508.
304 Id. at 508–09. Chief Justice Roberts may simply be wrong about the meaning of the
term “undertakes to comply” as used in treaties. See, e.g., Meera Rajnikant Shah, Unnecessary
Complications for Basic Obligations: Medellı́n v. Texas and Common Article 3, 41 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 883, 896 (2010) (“However, in international law, the term ‘undertakes’ has a wellestablished meaning as creating a definite obligation.”); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law
of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV.
599, 661 (2008) (“In international law usage, an ‘undertaking’ is well recognized to be a hard,
immediate obligation.”). However, that does not in any way undermine the formalism of his
analysis.
305 Medellı́n, 552 U.S. at 505–06.
306 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 429 (2003).
307 Medellı́n, 552 U.S. at 526.
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within Jackson’s third category, against the implied will of Congress,
and thus beyond his authority.308 Gone is any of Jackson’s ambiguity
about the meaning of congressional silence or the boundaries between
his “practical situations.”309 The memorandum cannot preempt state
law.
And what of Garamendi? Chief Justice Roberts distinguished it.
He narrowed the precedent to the sole context of international claims
settlement.310
Medellı́n, to be sure, is not without functionalist language. In
finding the U.N. Charter non-self-executing, Chief Justice Roberts
looked also to the United States’s role in the U.N. Security Council
and its ability to veto any resolution ordering it to comply with ICJ
judgments. The United States must, in Chief Justice Roberts’s estimation, have intended to leave itself maximum flexibility.311 Moreover,
there is considerable discussion of what the Senate must be presumed
to assume about non-self-executing treaty provisions and their operation.312 Both lines of thought emphasize judgments about how American foreign policy is meant to operate as opposed to specific
interpretative or constitutional rules. Nonetheless, the tone and rhetoric of the majority opinion is very much that of formalism, of clear
roles, of rules, and of constraint.
3. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.
This newly invigorated formalism was not confined to Hamdan
and Medellı́n. In Morrison, a suit by foreign securities purchasers
against a foreign bank regarding securities sold on a foreign exchange,
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, rejected the Second Circuit’s
longstanding “conduct” and “effects” tests for jurisdiction over securities fraud cases brought under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.313 Designed to capture Congress’s likely intent in
enacting 10(b), the tests found jurisdiction whenever “the wrongful
conduct had a substantial effect in the United States or upon United
States citizens,” or when “the wrongful conduct occurred in the
Id. at 528.
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
310 Medellı́n, 552 U.S. at 532.
311 See id.
312 See id. at 525–27.
313 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012)); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261
(2010).
308
309
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United States.”314 Justice Scalia rejected this “judicial-speculationmade-law.”315 Instead of “divining what Congress would have wanted
if it had thought of the situation before the court,”316 wrote Justice
Scalia, the courts should “apply the presumption [against extraterritoriality] in all cases, preserving a stable background against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.”317 Applying the
presumption and returning to the text of the statute, the proper test
would turn on whether the securities “transaction” took place in the
United States.318
Emphasizing the stakes of the case, Justice Scalia painted the government and petitioners arguing for another test as functionalists,
“set[ting] forth a number of purposes such a test would serve.”319
That alternative test, however, has “no textual support,”320 Justice
Scalia concluded. And, “[i]t is [the Court’s] function to give the statute the effect its language suggests, however modest that may be; not
to extend it to admirable purposes it might be used to achieve.”321
4. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Kiobel cites Morrison
and follows a similar logic. Kiobel initially came to the Court on the
question of corporate liability under the ATS.322 Determining
whether corporations could be liable under the statute would have
required careful analysis of international law, federal common law,
and their interaction in the wake of Justice Souter’s functionalist Sosa
decision.323 In fact, it was Sosa’s open-ended, functionalist analysis of
the ATS that opened up the corporate liability question in the first
place: the question was one specifically left open in one of Sosa’s footId. at 257 (quoting SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192–93 (2d Cir. 2003)).
Id. at 261.
316 Id.
317 Id.; cf. Dodge, supra note 218, at 548 (contrasting a more functionalist Ginsburg-Breyer
“legitimate sovereign interest” approach to transnational regulatory conflicts visible in Empagran with a more formalist Thomas-Scalia “territorial” approach visible in Morrison).
318 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266–68.
319 Id. at 270 (“The Solicitor General sets forth a number of purposes such a test would
serve: achieving a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry, ensuring honest
securities markets and thereby promoting investor confidence, and preventing the United States
from becoming a ‘Barbary Coast’ for malefactors perpetrating frauds in foreign markets.”). Justice Scalia also expresses serious skepticism about such functionalist endeavors. Id.
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013).
323 See, e.g., Ingrid Wuerth, The Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law: A New Approach, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1931, 1931–32 (2010).
314
315
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notes.324 At oral arguments, though, it became clear that at least some
Justices wanted to explore a different question, whether the ATS applied to extraterritorial conduct at all.325 The Court ordered briefing
and re-argument on that issue,326 and in its eventual decision in the
case “conclude[d] that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and that nothing in the statute rebuts
that presumption.”327 The Nigerian plaintiffs’ claims in Kiobel, arising
as they did out of the conduct of a Dutch corporation in Nigeria, were
thus barred.328
Again, as with other formalist opinions, Kiobel is not without its
functionalist flourishes. Chief Justice Roberts cited “the danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy”329 as a
reason to apply the presumption. He also noted that the traditional
rule applies to statutes in which Congress is regulating conduct rather
than jurisdiction; the Court applied the rule to this jurisdictional statute, the ATS, because it shares functional similarities that suggest that
similar principles should apply.330 Most noted, he seems to leave open
a new functional-sounding test for the causes of action that can be
brought: “claims [which] touch and concern the territory of the United
States . . . with sufficient force to displace the presumption against
extraterritorial application.”331 Whatever this means, “mere corporate
presence” does not “suffice[ ].”332 Again though, the rhetoric of the
opinion is thoroughly formalist, arguing for a rule-based approach
that keeps the courts from overstepping their constitutional role.
324 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004) (“A related consideration is
whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the
perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual.”).
325 See Transcript of Oral Argument (Feb. 28, 2012) at 9–14, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No.10-1491), 2012 WL 628670. See generally Transcript of Oral
Argument (Oct. 1, 2012), Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 101491), 2012 WL 4486095.
326 Order in Pending Case at 1, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659
(2013) (No. 10-1491), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/030512zr.pdf.
327 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
328 Id.
329 Id. at 1664.
330 Id.; see Anthony J. Colangelo, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations in Kiobel
and Beyond, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1329, 1345 (2013) (arguing that in Kiobel, “the Supreme Court
contradicted Congress’s intent by using the presumption against extraterritoriality to limit the
reach of the ATS”); Austen L. Parrish, Kiobel, Unilateralism, and the Retreat from Extraterritoriality, 28 MD. J. INT’L L. 208, 211 (2013) (framing Kiobel as one case in a line of cases involving
“unilateral, extraterritorial regulation”).
331 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
332 Id.
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Notably, the concurring Justices adopted a considerably more
functionalist test, one that would find jurisdiction where
(1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct
substantially and adversely affects an important American
national interest, and that includes a distinct interest in
preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor
(free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or
other common enemy of mankind.333
But even that test is considerably more rules-oriented than the freewheeling, open-ended standards of Sosa.334
5. Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority and Daimler AG v.
Bauman
The limited nature of the Kiobel concurring Justices’ functionalism is apparent from two other Roberts Court majority opinions written by those Justices: Mohamad, written by Justice Sotomayor, and
last Term’s Bauman, written by Justice Ginsburg.
Mohamad raised a question very similar to one originally before
the Court in Kiobel335: to what extent could plaintiffs sue organizations for torture and extrajudicial killing, in this case, under the statutory language of the Torture Victim Protection Act336 rather than the
broad vague jurisdictional grant of the Alien Tort Statute?337 Rejecting the arguments made by the plaintiffs and accepted in some
lower courts that the functional purpose of the Act required holding
organizations liable, Justice Sotomayor focused on the formal language of the statute and its repeated use of the term “individual”
when discussing liability.338 No functionalist argument could overcome such clear language, explained Justice Sotomayor.339
Id. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring).
See supra notes 185–205 and accompanying text. In fact, the concurring Justices’ test,
which might be thought of as a presumption against “extrajurisdictionality,” echos Justice
Scalia’s dissenting approach in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813–21
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting), a more formalist alternative to the functional comity test adopted
by the Justice Souter-led majority.
335 The two were initially treated as parallel cases by the Court. See Marcia Coyle, Torture
Victims Cannot Sue Foreign Organizations Under Federal Act, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 19, 2012, at 2
(stating that Mohamad was “argued in tandem” with Kiobel in February 2012).
336 Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
337 See Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1706 (2012) (“[P]etitioners filed this
action against respondents, the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, asserting . . . claims of torture and extrajudicial killing under the TVPA.”).
338 Id. at 1706–11.
339 Id. at 1710.
333
334
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Bauman raised a different set of issues related to human rights
litigation. In that case, the question was when and how plaintiffs
could establish personal jurisdiction over a parent company through
the local activities of one of its subsidiaries.340 A group of Argentinian
plaintiffs had sought to sue DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellschaft
(Daimler), a German company, for the company’s alleged complicity
in human rights abuses committed during Argentina’s Dirty War.341
The plaintiffs sued in California, asserting that Mercedes-Benz USA’s
(Daimler’s Delaware-incorporated American subsidiary) extensive
contacts with the forum (it sells cars in California) were sufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction over Daimler for the alleged acts in Argentina.342 Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg rejected the
highly functionalist test applied by the Ninth Circuit to impute Mercedes-Benz USA’s contacts to Daimler. Withholding judgment on the
Circuit’s more general agency theory of attribution, Justice Ginsburg
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s test of whether the subsidiary’s services
were “important” to the parent.343 “Formulated this way, the inquiry
into importance stacks the deck, for it will always yield a pro-jurisdiction answer,”344 Justice Ginsburg wrote. Moreover, even if MercedesBenz USA’s contacts could be attributed to Daimler, neither Mercedes-Benz USA’s nor Daimler’s contacts with California were sufficient for the exercise of general jurisdiction (the only basis for
extending jurisdiction over acts in Argentina as opposed to California). The test for general personal jurisdiction, Justice Ginsburg explained, is not “whether a foreign corporation’s in-forum contacts can
be said to be in some sense ‘continuous and systematic,’ it is whether
that corporation’s ‘affiliations with the State are “so continuous and
systematic” as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum
State.’ ”345 A functionalist sounding test (“continuous and systematic”
contacts), devised for functionalist purposes (due process, notice, and

340

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014).

341

Id. at 750–51.

342

Id. at 751–52.

343

See id. at 759–60.

344

Id. at 759.

Id. at 761 (alteration in original) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)). Importantly, Justice Ginsburg does then strike a functionalist note, explaining how concerns about comity and foreign relations militate against broad
claims of personal jurisdiction that might reach actions and entities with little relation to the
United States. Id. at 763 (“The Ninth Circuit . . . paid little heed to the risks to international
comity its expansive view of general jurisdiction posed.”).
345
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confidence in structuring one’s affairs),346 turns out to be considerably
more formal and rule-like in application.
6. Bond v. United States
The most recent evidence of the Justices’ common, developing
aversion for foreign affairs functionalism comes from Bond. The case
revolved around Carol Anne Bond, who, finding that her husband had
an affair, sought to poison his mistress by putting toxic chemicals on
her car door handles and mailbox.347 After her scheme was discovered, Bond was charged with and eventually convicted of a federal
crime—violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act.348 In the face of broad statutory language suggesting that her
actions were in fact covered by the Act,349 Bond challenged her conviction on Tenth Amendment grounds, arguing that the criminalization of a purely “domestic” affair was beyond Congress’s power.350
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction,351 relying
on the longstanding precedent of Missouri v. Holland352 and its holding that Congress could pass laws “necessary and proper” to implement valid treaties of the United States, even if those laws would
otherwise be beyond Congress’s enumerated powers.353
Although Bond did not present a circuit split—Holland has been
consistently applied over the near century since it was decided—the
Court’s interest in the case was unsurprising. Justice Holmes’s Holland opinion upholding the Migratory Bird Treaty Act354 strikes a
highly functionalist tone.355 The opinion describes the Constitution as
a living, adapting organism, one now very different from the one first
See id. at 753, 761–62.
See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2085 (2014).
348 Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112
Stat. 2681 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
349 Section 229(a)(1) of the Act prohibits “any person knowingly—(1) to develop, produce,
otherwise acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use,
or threaten to use, any chemical weapon.” 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1) (2012). Section 229F(1)(A)
defines “chemical weapon” as “[a] toxic chemical.” Id. § 229F(1)(A). Section 229(F)(8)(A) defines “toxic chemical” as “any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can
cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.” Id.
§ 229F(8)(A).
350 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2086.
351 Id.
352 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
353 See id. at 432.
354 Migratory Bird Treaty Act, Pub. L. No. 65-186, 40 Stat. 755 (1918).
355 Much as William Eskridge would suggest, see supra note 70, at 29, Justice Holmes’s
Holland opinion upholding the Migratory Bird Treaty Act presents a grab-bag of interpretive
346
347
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drafted and ratified.356 “We must consider what this country has become,”357 Justice Holmes observed. Moreover, the case involved “a
national interest of very nearly the first magnitude,”358 and the Court
saw “nothing in the Constitution that compels the Government to sit
by while a food supply is cut off and the protectors of our forests and
our crops are destroyed.”359 And the result of that functionalism is a
famously (or infamously, depending on one’s perspective) broad grant
of authority to the political branches. So long as there is a valid treaty
and the act “does not contravene any prohibitory words”360 in the
Constitution (for example, Bill of Rights protections361), there may be
no limits on what Congress can do to implement a treaty.362
Bond highlighted the breadth of that power. In an era of globalization, the domestic affairs of states—from human rights to crime
control to economic and social policies—are increasingly the subject
of international coordination and agreement. Federal power over
treaty implementation might even reach a purely local crime like
Bond’s; the decision seemed to lie entirely in the hands of federal
prosecutors. For a Roberts Court seemingly worried about political
branch foreign-affairs overreach, Holland must have looked ripe for
reconsideration.
Most observers have focused on the fact that, in the end, a majority of the Court chose to leave Holland intact.363 Only the concurring
methodologies, including textualist and historical arguments. But it is the opinion’s functionalism that stands out.
356 Holland, 252 U.S. at 433 (“With regard to that we may add that when we are dealing
with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must
realize that they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been
foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to
hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors
much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years
ago.”).
357 Id. at 434.
358 Id. at 435.
359 Id.
360 Id. at 433.
361 See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957).
362 See Holland, 252 U.S. at 432 (“If the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the
validity of the statute under Article I, Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the
powers of the Government.”).
363 See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Chemical Arms Pact Doesn’t Cover Case of Romantic Rivalry,
WASH. POST, June 3, 2014, at A4 (“But the unanimous court sidestepped a broader constitutional question about the power of Congress to pass laws implementing international treaties.
This question had elevated Carol Anne Bond’s case from a soap opera to the latest chapter in
the nation’s long-running political debate over the limits of federal power.”); David Golove &
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Justices, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, would have adopted
strong formalist tests to either circumscribe Congress’s power to implement364 or to define a valid treaty.365 Focusing entirely on the majority’s decision to leave Holland in place, however, misses the real
story.
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority decision rejects the government’s
determination that Bond’s actions were covered by the Chemical
Weapons Convention Implementation Act, dismissing the broad
(seemingly dispositive) language Congress used.366 The Court was not
simply going to defer to the other branches’ unfettered judgment.
Congressional legislation, even seemingly clear legislation, must be
read in light of a “background assumption that Congress normally
preserves ‘the constitutional balance between the National Government and the States.’ ”367 Only a clear statement from Congress that it
intends to alter that balance can override such a presumption. Bond’s
crime, which would normally fall under state authority, should be assumed to remain outside the ambit of the Conventional Weapons
Convention Implementation Act, notwithstanding the Act’s broad
language or the executive branch’s views.
Like some of Chief Justice Roberts’s other opinions, Bond is hard
to categorize as purely formalist or functionalist. His discovery of ambiguity, not in the statute’s language,368 but in conventional,369 colloquial370 understandings of “chemical weapons,” certainly seems
Marty Lederman, Stepping Back from the Precipice in Bond, JUST SECURITY (June 3, 2014, 5:40
PM), http://justsecurity.org/11161/bond-golove-lederman/.
364 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2098–99 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing
that the Constitution’s “necessary and proper” clause and treaty clause authorize Congress to
enact laws to facilitate the treaty-making process, but “do not authorize Congress to enact laws
for carrying into execution ‘Treaties’ ”).
365 Id. at 2108 (Thomas, J., concurring) (advocating limiting the United States’ treaty-making power to agreements that “relate to intercourse with other nations (including their people
and property), rather than to purely domestic affairs”); id. at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing “that the treaty power is limited to agreements that address matters of legitimate international concern”). Of course, a formal test limiting treaties to “matters of international
intercourse” like that suggested by Justices Thomas and Alito might itself be subject to highly
functionalist (and subjective) views of what would count. Id. at 2109 (Thomas, J., concurring).
366

See supra note 349.

Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2091 (majority opinion) (quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
2355, 2364 (2011)).
367

368

Id. at 2096 (Scalia, J., concurring).

See id. at 2090 (majority opinion) (explaining that “an educated user of English would
not describe Bond’s crime as involving a ‘chemical weapon’ ”).
369

370 See id. (looking to what an “an ordinary person would associate with instruments of
chemical warfare”).
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functionalist in approach.371 And it certainly is not as formalist as the
textualist approach advocated by Justice Scalia.372 But the tone of
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion fits well with the others described in
this Article.373 He describes the “presumption of federalism” applied
in Bond as a formal tool: a generally applicable374 presumption that
should be used to resolve all ambiguities in statutory language, a clear
statement rule375 Congress must follow if it wants to legislate with regard to traditionally local affairs. And while this result may be narrow
with regard to treaties (far narrower than overruling Holland would
have been), it may have far broader consequences across the broader
expanse of foreign affairs law, suggesting that all foreign affairs legislation should be read against (and arguably narrowed by) this presumption.376 Certainly, this presumption provides a new tool the
Court can use to rein in political branch foreign-affairs overreach.
371 In an example of the opinion’s sometime-functionalism, Chief Justice Roberts writes of
the particular circumstances that determine this case: “In this case, the ambiguity derives from
the improbably broad reach of the key statutory definition given the term—‘chemical weapon’—
being defined; the deeply serious consequences of adopting such a boundless reading; and the
lack of any apparent need to do so in light of the context from which the statute arose—a treaty
about chemical warfare and terrorism.” Id. This functionalist rationale is certainly Justice
Scalia’s criticism. See id. at 2095–96 (Scalia, J., concurring).
372 See id. at 2094–102.
373 One might be tempted to describe Roberts’s opinions in Bond, Kiobel, and Medellı́n as
a sort of faux-formalism, a formalism in name only that smuggles functionalist considerations
into formalist sounding tests like the presumption against extraterritoriality, a textualist approach to the self-executing treaty provisions, or a “presumption of federalism.” Certainly, each
of these opinions has been criticized along these lines. See supra notes 140–41, 329–31, 371 and
accompanying text. Far from undermining the formalist trend of the current Court though, this
functionalism-disguised-as-formalism would actually underline it, demonstrating how important
formalist rhetoric has become in justifying the Court’s opinions.
374 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2090 (majority opinion) (“These precedents make clear that it is
appropriate to refer to basic principles of federalism embodied in the Constitution to resolve
ambiguity in a federal statute.”); see also id. at 2089 (describing the presumption as a “wellestablished principle”).

R

375 Id. at 2089 (explaining that “ ‘it is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of
Congress’ intent before finding that federal law overrides’ the ‘usual constitutional balance of
federal and state powers’ ” (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991))); id. at 2090
(“We conclude that, in this curious case, we can insist on a clear indication that Congress meant
to reach purely local crimes, before interpreting the statute’s expansive language in a way that
intrudes on the police power of the States.”).
376 This could, for example, have a significant impact on preemption doctrine. It has sometimes been assumed that in contrast to domestic affairs, where statutes are presumed not to
preempt state law, see, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), in foreign
affairs, statutes might be presumed to preempt state laws, see Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000). Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498–99 (2012),
actually seems to re-endorse such a presumption in favor of preemption in the immigration context. See infra note 420 and accompanying text.
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But what is most notable about Bond is the absence of any dissents. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor. None of them wrote
separately to protect the deference traditionally granted to the political branches’ views of treaty implementation. None wrote separately
to argue against a “clear statement” rule in light of functionalist concerns about the complexity of foreign affairs. All nine Justices, including the three writing concurrences, seemed convinced that the era of
unreviewed political branch discretion over treaty implementation
needed to end.
7. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton
The case, though, that truly highlights the Court’s newfound foreign affairs formalism is Zivotofsky. This case involves a challenge to
the State Department’s longstanding policy of recording “Jerusalem,”
rather than “Israel” in U.S. passports as the place of birth for those
born in that city. Citing legislation requiring the State Department to
record “Israel” when the parents so request,377 Menachem Binyamin
Zivotofsky’s parents filed suit. The majority in the D.C. Circuit found
the suit to be a nonjusticiable political question.378 The policy in question involved the recognition of governments, a power textually committed to the President in the Article II power to “receive
ambassadors.”379 Under Supreme Court precedent, the majority explained, “courts may not consider claims that raise issues whose resolution has been committed to the political branches by the text of the
Constitution.”380 Judge Edwards added a concurrence, agreeing that
the State Department’s policy was a valid use of the President’s recognition power, but disagreeing that it was a political question.381
Given the lack of a circuit split and the fact that Zivotofsky lost
on either opinion in the D.C. Circuit, many observers wondered why
the Court would grant certiorari.382 The eventual decision left no
377 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107–228, 116 Stat.
1350, 1366 (2002).
378 Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated sub nom.
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012).
379 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Zivotofsky, 571 F.3d at 1231–33.
380 Zivotofsky, 571 F.3d at 1230.
381 Id. at 1233–45 (Edwards, J., concurring).
382 See, e.g., Doug Mataconis, Supreme Court Asked to Decide if “Born in Jerusalem”
Means “Born in Israel,” OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY (July 26, 2011), http://www.outsidethe
beltway.com/supreme-court-asked-to-decide-if-born-in-jerusalem-means-born-in-israel/ (“Given
the extent to which Federal Courts have typically demurred in ruling on issues involving foreign
affairs and disputes between the Executive and Legislature Branches, it’s somewhat surprising
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doubt: a large majority of the Justices (only Justice Breyer dissented)
wanted to discipline the lower courts in their use of the political question doctrine.383
In an earlier decision, Baker v. Carr,384 the Supreme Court listed
six factors to consider in determining whether a case should be dismissed as a nonjusticiable political question:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.385
Over the decades that followed Baker, decisions finding political
questions based on those factors became extraordinarily rare. Only
with regard to foreign affairs was the doctrine regularly applied to
justify judicial abstention.386 Moreover, the use of the doctrine was
very loose. Any case threatening to undermine a foreign policy judgment of the political branches or the government’s ability to speak
with “one voice” on foreign affairs might be dismissed on political
question grounds. The effect of this highly functionalist inquiry was to
insulate the decisions of the political branches, and particularly the
President, from ordinary judicial scrutiny.387
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for himself and five other Justices,388 announced the return of the courts to foreign affairs. Noting
that “the Judiciary has a responsibility to decide cases properly before
that the Supreme Court has apparently decided to take the case on directly on the merits of the
argument.”).
383

See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1430–31 (2012).

384

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

385

Id. at 217.

See Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 1403 (citing THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESANSWERS 19–20 (1992)).
387 See id. at 1401–02 (stating the prevailing view after Baker that courts should not scrutinize the decisions of the political branches that touch directly on foreign affairs).
388 Justices Sotomayor and Alito added separate concurrences.
386

TIONS/JUDICIAL
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it, even those it ‘would gladly avoid,’ ”389 and describing the political
question doctrine as a “narrow exception,” the Court held that
Zivotofsky’s claim was justiciable.390 The Court will dismiss those
cases that force it to review a question textually committed to another
branch, Justice Roberts explained.391 But that is not the claim
Zivotofsky raised. Instead, the question raised by Zivotofsky’s claim
was one of constitutional interpretation: which branch, Congress or
the President, has the authority to determine the “place of birth” notation on U.S. passports?392 The political question doctrine only kicks
in once that decision is made. Once it is determined which branch has
the authority to make that policy judgment, then policy decisions of
that branch will be nonjusticiable.
Importantly, beyond disciplining the use of the first Baker factor,
the Court also seemed to implicitly disapprove of others. Only the
first two factors—“a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it”—
are mentioned by the majority as reasons to abstain.393 Notably, these
are the most formal and rule-like of the factors. The others (the
avoidance of judicial policymaking, the need to avoid embarrassment,
the need for finality, or concerns about maintaining one voice in foreign affairs),394 each requiring its own functional analysis and collectively responsible for the expansion of the political question doctrine
over the decades following Baker,395 seem to have slipped away.
8. Formalism’s Function?
What should one make of the Roberts Court’s formalist shift in
foreign affairs law? One might be tempted to see the formalist rhetoric in these decisions as purely opportunistic. Opposing a Republican
President’s claims of unilateral power in detainee affairs, a liberal majority of the Court used formalist reasoning to reign him in; a conservative majority of the Court, believed to be favorable to
corporations and hostile to plaintiffs, used formalist rhetoric to narrow the opportunities to sue foreign defendants. Undoubtedly, polit389 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012) (quoting Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)).
390 Id. at 1427, 1430.
391 Id. at 1427.
392 Id. at 1427–28.
393 Id. at 1427 (quoting Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993)).
394 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211, 217 (1962).
395 See Goldsmith, supra note , at 1402–03.
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ics are part of the story of particular opinions. But by now, this trend
seems deeper, broader, and more durable than any political explanation would suggest, with some opinions defying easy ideological characterizations.396 At the very least, there has been a shift in the Court’s
mood.
The real evidence of this shift may come in the concurrences.
The Justices who rejected Justice Scalia’s and Chief Justice Roberts’s
formalist approaches to extraterritoriality in Morrison397 and Kiobel398
nonetheless found against the plaintiffs in both cases and suggested
alternative ways to limit excessive litigation. Tellingly, they did not
make the robust argument for discretion that one might find in
Sosa.399 As suggested above, this is formalism’s and functionalism’s
rhetorical force—it can change the terms of the debate, forcing everyone to respond.400
It is Zivotofsky that brings the Roberts Court trend401 into sharp
focus. The political question doctrine has often been the poster child
for both functionalism and foreign affairs exceptionalism. In Zivotofsky, the Court reached out to decide the case—not to resolve a circuit
split, or even the claim at hand, but to bring discipline to the political
question doctrine, to give form to a functionalist doctrine, and to bring
ordinary judicial scrutiny to political branch foreign affairs decisions.
This rounds out the story that began with Hamdan. The formalism of these cases is the formalism of distrust. In Hamdan, a majority
that included the more liberal Justices expressed distrust in how the
executive branch was using the wide berth it has traditionally been
given. In Medellı́n, a majority that included the more conservative
Justices expressed a similar view. Bond unified all nine. In Hamdan,
396 See, e.g., Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1706–07 (2012) (in which Justice Sotomayor narrowed the ability of plaintiffs to sue for human rights abuses); Medellı́n v.
Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008) (in which Chief Justice Roberts rejected President Bush’s claims
of Executive authority); see also Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1424 (in which Chief Justice Roberts
was joined by a very broad majority of the Court). One part of the story might be a shift in the
style of conservatism represented on the Court, moving from a strand that favors executive
power to a more libertarian one.
397 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 274–86 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
398 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1670–78 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
399 See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing Sosa’s approach).
400 See supra Part I.B.
401 Another case that could be discussed here is Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010), in
which the majority applied formalist reasoning to hold that the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act
does not cover individuals, even as functionalist arguments strongly suggested it should. Id. at
313–26.
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the majority expressed its doubts about congressional silence. Majorities in Medellı́n, Morrison, and Kiobel seemed to agree.402
This distrust is amplified by the realization that the line between
foreign and domestic affairs may no longer be sustainable. Each of
the decisions expresses its own unease with this reality. In Hamdan,
the broad discretion associated with the terms “foreign affairs” or
“national security” seems poorly suited to the President’s absolute
control over detainees.403 Medellı́n and Bond express the opposite
worry—that in a globalized world, even the most domestic of affairs,
local murder and assault prosecutions, now plausibly raise foreign policy concerns. If presidential foreign policy is enough to preempt state
laws, few state laws will be safe; if treaty implementation can federalize crimes, state police power will quickly be crowded out. And in
Morrison and Kiobel, the Court seemed concerned with the ease with
which foreigners and foreign conduct can be brought under American
regulation. The Court seems like the worried parents of a teenager,
watchful of both the (potentially negative) influence of their child’s
friends and how their child’s (potentially dangerous) acts might impact others. Foreign affairs functionalism, the Court seems to worry,
like the keys to the family car or no curfew, might just be too much of
a temptation. Gone is the Souter Court’s confidence in the three
branches’ ability to work together; gone is its optimistic view of
globalization. The argument for foreign affairs exceptionalism seems
outdated.
This formalism is also the formalism of constraint. The Souter
Court’s functionalism sought to empower the federal government.
But if the President, Congress, and even the courts cannot be trusted
with discretion, they will have to be hemmed in by rules and doctrine.
Special deference to the Executive on foreign affairs now seems illplaced. The Executive will now be bound by the same rules in foreign
affairs that bind him in domestic ones. Nor will he be given the benefit of the doubt when acting on his own. Youngstown’s famous “practical situations” become formal categories. Presidential action in
Justice Jackson’s third category becomes forbidden; the scope of that
category grows larger. Congress too is constrained. Congress will
have to speak much more clearly if it wants to take away rights, step
402

The Justices in Bond are skeptical of Congress even when it speaks. See supra Part

II.B.6.
403 See supra notes 292–94 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 131–37 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s unwillingness to shield U.S. forces from judicial control
merely because they are a part of a multilateral force).
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into traditional state domains, or extend its regulations abroad. Congress cannot simply delegate the decision to plaintiffs and watch what
happens; it must actively consider the policy implications of what such
suits might mean.404 The real dividing line in the Court is whether the
lower courts need to be constrained as well. The conservative majorities in Kiobel, Morrison, and Medellı́n seemed to think so, rejecting
the more discretionary rules those courts had been developing or applying. The more liberal justices seemed less sure, reining in courts in
Zivotofsky, Bauman, and Mohamad, but also more willing to adopt
standards rather than rules in Kiobel, Morrison, and Medellı́n.
But most of all, the Roberts Court’s formalism is the formalism of
control. The Court is taking it back from the President, from Congress, and even from the lower federal courts.405 That is the message
of Zivotofsky. The Court is skeptical of the executive branch’s claims
that it knows better, that it should not be second-guessed, and that it
needs room to maneuver in a dangerous world. From Hamdan406 and
Medellı́n407 to BG Group,408 Bond,409 and NML Capital,410 the Executive’s views are being brushed aside. Perhaps in a post-Cold War
world, more than a decade removed from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the foreign policy threats to the United States no
longer look as existential, as dangerous, or as incomprehensible to the
Court as they once did.411 The costs of making a mistake no longer
seem so profound. The Court views itself to be as well-placed as any
other actor to make the hard decisions—perhaps even better placed.
It should be noted that there are two key exceptions to this trend
during this period. The first is Boumediene, in which the majority
404 In a sense, this makes Kiobel and Morrison “democracy forcing” decisions in the same
vein as Hamdan, see, e.g., Pearlstein, supra note 105, at 830–33, striking down potential meanings
of the law in order to incentivize Congress to be more active. See Eric Berger, Individual Rights,
Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 2029, 2094–95 (2011) (discussing “democracy-forcing” generally).
405 This control is augmented by the uncertain boundaries of many of the formalist rules
the Court announces. Despite the language of formalism, many of the rules are novel, e.g., the
application of the rules against extraterritoriality to the ATS or the “presumption of federalism”
announced in Bond. This means that the Court will by necessity continue to control what exactly
these rules mean and how they apply.
406 See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
407 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
408 See discussion infra Part III.A.
409 See discussion supra Part II.B.6.
410 See discussion infra Part III.A.
411 See Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J.
649, 652–53, 713 (2002) (prophesizing that in a plurilateral, post–Cold War world, the Court
would start to pull back on its traditional deference to the executive branch).
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found that constitutional habeas corpus applied to detainees held at
Guantanamo Bay based on a highly functionalist reading of habeas
corpus and a highly functionalist conception of de facto sovereignty.412
The test adopted of what habeas review should entail also took the
form of a highly functionalist multifactor balancing test.413 The second, Arizona v. United States,414 relied heavily on the highly functionalist decision in Hines v. Davidowitz415 and the purported foreign
affairs implications of immigration policy to preempt Arizona’s immigration law.416 It would be anachronistic and odd if every decision fit
a single pattern, particularly given the shifting majorities in these
cases. But some explanation is possible.
First, both decisions were written by Justice Kennedy, an avowed
foreign affairs functionalist. Justice Kennedy had been suggesting the
functionalist “what process is due” analysis since at least as far back as
his concurrence in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.417 His continuing commitment to foreign affairs functionalism is evident in his concurrence in Kiobel, where he emphasized that the majority opinion
properly “is careful to leave open a number of significant questions
regarding the reach and interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute.”418
(There is an irony in the fact that shifting 5-4 majorities have formed
around formalism, even as the Court’s usual fifth vote remains a functionalist.) Moreover, as will be discussed in the next section, the
Court has repeatedly refused to revisit or extend Boumediene, perhaps indicating some discomfort with the decision and its functionalist
framework.419 Arizona also operates to constrain the states and their
impacts on foreign affairs. Constraining the federal government and
constraining the states may not be an either-or choice. In a globalized
world, both the federal government and the states may be able to enSee Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797–98 (2008).
Id. at 766–69.
414 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2495 (2012).
415 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
416 See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498 (relying on brief from former Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright).
417 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
418 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
419 Also, while Boumediene is unquestionably functionalist in style, it exhibits no less distrust that other Roberts Court opinions. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765–66 (2008)
(emphasizing that “[t]he test for determining the scope of [the Suspension Clause] must not be
subject to manipulation by those whose power it is designed to restrain”). It thus serves to
emphasize the underlying sentiment animating the Court during this period.
412
413
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danger the Republic if unconstrained.420 Even as it embraces functionalism, Arizona may emanate from the same impulse as the other
decisions’ formalism.421 In a sense, Arizona may be the exception that
proves the rule. As discussed earlier, the patterns of formalism and
functionalism across different cases can reveal aspects of the Court’s
underlying philosophy. Here, maintaining functionalism as a constraint on state action may highlight the Court’s desire to constrain all
actors in the face of globalization.
III. WHEN FOREIGN AFFAIRS BECOMES ORDINARY
What should we make of this turn to formalism in foreign affairs?
How might the Roberts Court’s concerns about globalization and distrust of the government manifest itself going forward? At the very
least, litigants before the Court would be well-advised to adjust their
arguments accordingly. Functionalist arguments for deference and
discretion may not fare as well as narrower, more formalist ones. But
two broader trends associated with the Court’s new formalism are
worth watching: (1) the continued formalization of foreign affairs related doctrines and (2) the potential emergence of stealth or backdoor
functionalism.
A. Formalism’s Future
At this point, the Roberts Court’s distrust of the government and
its associated turn to foreign affairs formalism look like durable
trends. This resilience allows us to make some predictions about future Supreme Court opinions. Given the many moving parts in a particular case as well as the dynamics of building five-Justice majorities,
the end result of a case is always uncertain. Nonetheless, the Court’s
demonstrated desire to rein in other constitutional actors suggests the
type of cases that may be of interest over the next few years. As the
Court reconsiders the trust it has long deposited with political
branches in foreign affairs, longstanding functionalist doctrines de420 There is some tension here between Arizona and Medellı́n, the latter of which seemed
unconcerned about the foreign policy problems Texas was creating for the United States. In fact,
the argument that Texas’s actions had foreign policy implications was probably stronger than the
argument that Arizona’s actions had such implications. That said, one way to distinguish the two
is that in Medellı́n, the Texas court was simply applying its ordinary criminal procedure; any
foreign affairs implications were an afterthought. In Arizona, the state was actively trying to
involve itself in immigration policy, an area long connected with foreign affairs. Compare Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498, with Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 494 (2008).
421

It may even be evidence of how deep that philosophy of peril and distrust runs.
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signed to maximize political branch foreign affairs discretion should
be subject to new scrutiny.
The first such case is already on the Court’s docket. Zivotofsky is
already making its second appearance before the Court, in Zivotofsky
II to be decided this Term. As explained above,422 the case involves
the conflict between a longstanding State Department policy requiring
that the place of birth of Americans born in Jerusalem be recorded in
their passport simply as “Jerusalem” and a congressional act allowing
Americans to opt to have “Israel” recorded there instead. Citing the
President’s long-recognized power to recognize foreign governments
(derived from a functionalist reading of the Constitution’s grant to the
President of the power to “receive ambassadors”), the executive
branch claimed authority to ignore the statute.423 Continuing to serve
as an honest broker in peace talks, the Executive explained, required
the United States to express no opinion about Israeli or Palestinian
sovereignty over the disputed city of Jerusalem. Forced to decide the
case after the Court rejected its view that the case presented a nonjusticiable political question, the D.C. Circuit agreed with the Executive,
finding the recognition power exclusive to the President.424
It should hardly be surprising that the Court granted certiorari.
The Court has said little beyond dicta in the past about the recognition power, leaving the President to claim broad, exclusive powers
over anything related to the recognition of foreign governments,
claims to which lower courts have long deferred. But it is exactly
those broad claims for deference, based on functionalist justifications
for presidential preeminence or even exclusivity in foreign affairs,
which have now caught the Court’s attention. Moreover, Zivotofsky
II pits presidential claims against congressional actions, putting the
case squarely in Youngstown’s third category. While prior Courts
might have been open to the idea of powers exclusive to the President
allowing him to override or ignore contrary congressional action, the
Roberts Court has not viewed the third category that way. On the
contrary, Hamdan and Medellı́n suggest a more formal rule that presidential action in this category is simply forbidden.425 We will have to
wait to see what this Court actually does with Zivotofsky II, but it
should not be surprising if it second-guesses the Executive’s claims
422

See supra Part II.B.7.

423

Zivotofsky II, 725 F.3d 197, 206 (2013).

424

Id. at 219–20.

425

See supra notes 275–77, 304–10 and accompanying text.
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about the dangerousness of passport designations and attempts to define limits on the recognition power.426
But the recognition power is not the only area in which functionalist doctrines imbue the political branches with broad authority. Another such area might be the scope of the Foreign Commerce Clause
of the U.S. Constitution.427 That clause has generally been construed
as a broad grant of authority to Congress to manage our economic
relations with the rest of the world, one unconstrained by federalism
or the doctrinal constraints applied to the Interstate Commerce
Clause. United States v. Clark428 is a good example of how broadly the
clause has been construed. It also serves as an example of how globalization allows the United States to regulate ever more conduct
abroad, potentially eroding the case for foreign affairs exceptionalism.
Clark involved an individual who had been charged and convicted for
traveling to Cambodia to engage in commercial sex with a minor.429
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether
the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c), which provides that “[a]ny United
States citizen or alien admitted for permanent residence who travels
in foreign commerce, and engages in any illicit sexual conduct with
another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 30 years, or both,”430 was beyond Congress’s enumerated powers
with regard to foreign commerce. The Ninth Circuit held that it was
not, that “[t]he Court has been unwavering in reading Congress’s
power over foreign commerce broadly.”431
For a Roberts Court worried about the expansive reach of American law, whether with regard to military detention and trial, securities
law, or human rights litigation, Congress’s ability to regulate virtually
any conduct anywhere in the world that at least touches upon commerce would seem ripe for revisiting. Anthony Colangelo has suggested a more formal reading of the phrase “with foreign nations” in
426 One potential twist in this case is that Congress is also making somewhat extravagant
claims of authority. Although the statutory provision in question in Zivotofsky II concerns passport technicalities, the title of that section of the statute, “United States Policy with Respect to
Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel,” highlights Congress’s intention to do much more. See Jack
Goldsmith, How the Supreme Court Should Resolve Zivotofsky, LAWFARE (Oct. 30, 2014, 8:09
AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/10/how-the-supreme-court-should-resolve-zivitofsky/.
The Court’s distrust of both Congress and the Executive thus makes the case something of a
wildcard.
427 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
428 United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006).
429 Id. at 1103–04.
430 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2012).
431 Clark, 435 F.3d at 1113.
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the clause that would require a United States nexus for any congressional regulation.432 He has also suggested analogs to the sorts of limits now imposed on Congress’s power under the Interstate Commerce
Clause.433 One could imagine these being attractive to a newly formalist Court eager to limit foreign affairs exceptionalism.
The Charming Betsy doctrine presents a more complicated case.
Creating a presumption that “an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains,”434 the doctrine might in some cases provide a formal
means (much like the presumption against extraterritoriality, discussed above435) to rein in political actors who go too far or who are
too cavalier about international obligations.436 Arguably, the Court
used something like a Charming Betsy presumption in Hamdan to
read the Uniform Code of Military Justice as consistent with the laws
of war and to guarantee that neither the President nor Congress violated U.S. obligations too quickly or carelessly.437 In doing so, however, the Charming Betsy doctrine also empowers courts, letting them
decide what international law requires, how ambiguous a statute actually is, and when to incorporate international law into U.S. law. In
some cases, the Charming Betsy doctrine may provide a tool for courts
to impose an international obligation—for example, a human right.438
Given that one portion of the Court is seeking to constrain not only
political actors but lower federal courts as well, it would be unsurprising if they sought to discipline the use of the Charming Betsy doctrine.
An example of a rule that might prove attractive to the more conservative wing of the Court can be found in Judge Kavanaugh’s concurrence in Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Kempthorne.439 There, Judge
432

See Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 949, 970–71

(2010).
Id.
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
435 See supra notes 313–33 and accompanying text.
436 Justice Scalia suggested as much in his Hartford Fire dissent. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764, 814–21 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer’s concurrence in
Kiobel likewise uses the Charming Betsy presumption to fashion a more permissive test than the
majority’s, but one still capable of reining in ATS cases. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
133 S. Ct. 1659, 1677 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring).
437 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 613 (2006) (stating that the UCMJ requires that
the President’s actions accord with the law of nations).
438 See Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 829–30 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated sub nom. Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 598–99 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d
sub nom. Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003).
439 Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 472 F.3d 872, 879–82 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
433
434
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Kavanaugh argued that non-self-executing treaties did not deserve
Charming Betsy treatment.440 The argument, much like Chief Justice
Roberts’s in Medellı́n,441 was that by ratifying a non-self-executing
treaty, the President and Senate had specifically reserved to Congress
the decision on how and when to implement it.442 While this view is
hard to reconcile with the fact that Charming Betsy applies to customary international law as well as treaties (and thus seems to turn solely
on whether the United States has an international law obligation), it
does reflect the sort of bright-line constraints on federal judges attractive to the conservative wing of the Court.
Finally, a formalist turn by the Court may have an effect on the
traditional deference granted to executive branch treaty interpretations. Although the precise weight given to executive branch interpretations has remained somewhat unclear, some deference at least has
been the norm.443 But for a Roberts Court concerned about executive
branch overreach and opportunistic arguments about foreign affairs,
even that much deference may seem too much. Such skepticism is
visible in the majority opinion in Hamdan, which quickly dismisses the
President’s interpretation of the Geneva Conventions in favor of the
Court’s own construction.444 It is also on display in the Court’s recent
decision in BG Group, in which a majority led by Justice Breyer
brushed aside the United States’s interpretation of the United Kingdom-Argentina investment treaty.445 In that case, the Solicitor General made the functionalist-sounding argument that the prerequisites
to investor-initiated international arbitration were of great importance
to states (whether Argentina and the United Kingdom here or the
United States elsewhere), and that given that context, the “consent”
language of the treaty might be interpreted to make the treaty’s local
litigation requirement “a condition on the State’s consent to enter into
440

Id. at 879.

See supra notes 300–11 and accompanying text.
Kempthorne, 472 F.3d at 879 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
443 See, e.g., Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 513 (2008) (“It is . . . well settled that the
United States’ interpretation of a treaty is entitled to great weight.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999) (“Respect is
ordinarily due the reasonable views of the Executive Branch concerning the meaning of an international treaty.”); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961) (“[T]he meaning given [treaties]
by the departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement
is given great weight.”); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 295 (1933) (“[T]he construction
of a treaty by the political department of the government, while not conclusive upon courts . . .,
is nevertheless of weight.”).
444 See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
445 BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1208–09 (2014).
441
442
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an arbitration agreement.”446 The Court was unmoved. Notwithstanding the Court’s “respect [for] the Government’s views about the
proper interpretation of treaties,” the Court “d[id] not accept the Solicitor General’s view as applied to th[is] treaty.”447 Adopting a formalist tone, the Court framed the question as one of ordinary contract
interpretation (here, a contract between states), and thus one fully
within the expertise of the Court.448 Contrary to the Solicitor General’s suggestion, the Justices in the majority were “unable to find any
other authority or precedent suggesting that the use of the ‘consent’
label in a treaty should make a critical difference.”449
The opinion suggests that the Court has become suspicious either
of the executive branch’s position on the meaning of treaty provisions
or of the wisdom of deferring to it. Whether that suspicion means that
executive branch interpretations will carry less weight or that they will
be ignored altogether remains to be seen.450
These are but a few examples.451 The point is that any current
foreign affairs law doctrine that uses functionalist logic to grant federal actors broad discretion is an open target for reconsideration by
the current Supreme Court.
446

Id. at 1208.

447

Id. at 1208–09.

448

Id. at 1208.

449

Id. at 1209.

The case was of course concerned not with a treaty of the United States, but of two
other states. Perhaps the Court would be more deferential to the Executive’s interpretation of a
treaty it had actually ratified. That said, this decision may at least suggest the outer boundaries
of the deference a newly formalist, newly distrustful Court is willing to grant. In a related case
from the same Term, NML Capital, the Court similarly brushed aside the executive branch’s
views on judgment discovery under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Republic of Arg. v.
NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2258 (2014). The Executive’s concerns that a broad discovery rule might create serious tensions with foreign states was easily dismissed in favor of a more
formal reading of the statute. Although the Court has never been as deferential to the Executive
in FSIA cases as in treaty interpretation, the decision stands in some contrast to an earlier FSIA
decision, Altmann, see supra Part II.A.4, in which the Court suggested some room for executive
branch statements of interest in FSIA cases. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677,
702 & n.21 (2004); Ingrid Wuerth, Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital: Discovery and the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, LAWFARE (June 16, 2014, 10:28 PM), http://
www.lawfareblog.com/2014/06/republic-of-argentina-v-nml-capital-discovery-and-the-foreignsovereign-immunities-act/.
450

451 For example, another topic ripe for consideration by a distrustful and formalist Court
might be the scope and authority of sole executive and congressional-executive agreements. See
Peter Spiro, Are Sole Executive Agreements Next on the Roberts Court Chopping Block?, OPINIO
JURIS (May 8, 2014, 12:25 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/05/08/sole-executive-agreements-nextroberts-court-chopping-block/.
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B. Formalism’s Functionalism
Functionalism has long exerted a magnetic pull over foreign affairs cases. It is easy to understand the attraction. The world around
the United States is constantly changing; dealing with it may require
flexibility. Foreign countries are not bound by our Constitution and
may not have patience for its strictures. Moreover, as has long been
said, foreign affairs can be delicate, requiring special knowledge, expertise, and secrecy. Courts, reasonably or unreasonably, may feel
compelled to defer to the political branches as better situated to understand the situation and the ramifications of any U.S. action. It is
for these reasons that federal courts have long sought out doctrines of
abstention and deference to resolve foreign affairs cases, even as they
formalistically constrained political actors at home.452
The formalist trend in Roberts Court jurisprudence suggests that
the Court is trying to break free of functionalism’s pull. But can functionalism’s visceral appeal simply be willed away? One might be
skeptical. Undoubtedly, there will still be cases that seem so delicate,
so beyond the Court’s expertise, so political dangerous, and so hard to
solve with typical judicial tools that any court would think twice about
wading in. Perhaps in such cases the Court’s newfound formalism will
be brushed aside in favor of more traditional functionalism, which is
arguably what happened in Boumediene and Arizona.453
But there is another possibility: the Court may avoid those cases
altogether. The Court has clearly become uncomfortable with functionalism and the broad discretion it provides to various constitutional
actors. Retreating back to those methods when the issues seem too
fraught might undo all the Court’s work over the last nine years to
rein those actors in.454 And yet, formal tools seem inappropriate; the
only option may be to avoid the case altogether. Perhaps the plaintiff
has not pled properly or does not have standing. Important challenges to government antiterrorism efforts have been rejected by the
Court as too loosely pled455 or beyond the Court’s jurisdiction.456
Could members of the Court have shied away from Ashcroft v.
452 Compare Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 294 (1936) (holding that the Coal
Conservation Act was not within Congress’s Commerce Clause power using formalist reasoning), with United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936) (refusing to
apply the doctrine to foreign affairs). In both cases, the majority opinion was written by Justice
Sutherland.
453 See supra notes 414–20 and accompanying text.
454 One might say, when the going gets rough, the courts get functionalist.
455 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687 (2009).
456 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1155 (2013) (finding plaintiffs had
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Iqbal457 and Clapper v. Amnesty International USA458 for the same
reasons others embraced foreign affairs formalism? It is impossible to
know.
Even more extreme though, the Court may simply choose not to
grant a writ of certiorari at all. Observers have noted the Court’s extreme reluctance to consider any of the post-Boumediene detainee
cases. The Court has denied certiorari in nearly all of them,459 despite
the fact that many of them raise questions specifically left open in
Boumediene and in the face of near open defiance and naked disrespect by some members of the D.C. Circuit who have questioned the
wisdom of the decision and the Justices that voted for it.460 The best
account of this high court passivity may simply be uncertainty among
the other Justices as to how Justice Kennedy would hold in these follow-on cases. Without any guarantees as to how he would hold, the
other Justices may be wary to grant certiorari. But Boumediene was,
of course, notably functionalist in its approach, an exception to current trends that may weigh on the Justices. They may be uncomfortable with Boumediene’s open-ended logic, but uncertain of a formalist
alternative.461 The Court may be equally unwilling to reaffirm it and
uncomfortable reconsidering it.
In a sense, these techniques might serve as a sort of functionalism
by other means, allowing the Court to retreat from foreign affairs issues that may simply seem too fraught while granting the political
branches a certain amount of space to operate. The problem is that
this approach, if used (even implicitly or subconsciously), completely
lacks transparency. It is functionalism without accountability. When
no standing to challenge Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50
U.S.C. § 1881a (2012)).
457 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
458 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
459 The Court did grant certiorari in Kiyemba v. Obama, 559 U.S. 131 (2010), only to vacate
and remand it after the Administration notified the Court that it had procured agreements from
states willing to accept all the detainees in question. Id. at 131–32.
460 See Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L. REV.
1451, 1455 (2011) (“And in public speeches and concurrences, senior D.C. Circuit Judges A.
Raymond Randolph and Laurence Silberman have gone even further, belittling the Supreme
Court for what Judge Randolph referred to as the ‘mess’ they made and what Judge Silberman
described as a ‘charade,’ prompted by the Court’s ‘defiant—if only theoretical—assertion of
judicial supremacy’ in Boumediene.”); Lyle Denniston, Court Bypasses All New Detainee Cases,
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/court-bypasses-all-new-detainee-cases/ (last
updated June 11, 2012, 11:39 AM).
461 Arguably, the eventual functionalism of Boumediene stemmed from a concern that only
an open-ended grant of review authority could actually constrain an executive branch that had
pushed back hard, working to narrow each of the Court’s prior detainee decisions.
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the Court applies functionalist reasoning to defer to the government
in an opinion, it provides something for citizens to consider and scrutinize. Observers can decide for themselves whether the Court is being
overly deferential or whether the government has overreached or
needs to be pulled back in some other way. In a sense, the functionalist approach is meant to signal exactly that: scrutiny of the government’s actions should come through the political process.
But even if the Court is not ducking cases, there is a risk that
lower courts will. One of the lessons of the shifting rhetoric of formalism and functionalism is that it does not dictate outcomes. Different
aspects of a case and different doctrines can be looked at in formalist
or functionalist terms. It is the choices of which to focus on rather
than formalist or functionalist rhetoric itself that seem to drive the
result. Functionalism can be used as a doctrine of deference or a tool
of judicial control. Formalism can restrain government actors or judicial discretion. The point of exploring the Souter Court’s functionalism or the Roberts Court’s formalism is to reveal the patterns of
formalism and functionalism and the ideology that might be animating
them.
One possibility suggested by the patterns and their relationship to
traditional critiques of formalism and functionalism is that formalism
and functionalism may have different uses for the Supreme Court and
lower courts. Whether using functionalist or formalist techniques, the
Supreme Court has been accused of giving itself the final say in foreign affairs cases. On the flipside, lower courts are accused of being
too deferential when they apply loose doctrines of abstention or strict
rules regarding standing to make foreign affairs cases disappear. One
thing to watch out for in the latest rhetorical turn is that the formalism
of distrust might become, in the hands of lower court judges, the formalism of trust, with the lower courts leaning on the Court’s formalist
standing and pleading decisions rather than its formalist tests of governmental power.462

462 A different, interesting example might be the comparison between two recent decisions
on the legality of the NSA telephony metadata program, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724
(S.D.N.Y. 2013), and Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013). Judge Pauley’s decision for the Southern District of New York uses more formalist reasoning to suggest the legality
of the program and its insulation from certain lawsuits. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 741–42.
Judge Leon’s decision for the District of the District of Columbia, by contrast, uses functionalist
considerations to look past the formal terms of the statute and prior precedent and find the
program likely unconstitutional. Klayman, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 19–23.
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CONCLUSION
When it comes to foreign relations, the Roberts Court has trust
issues. As far as the Court is concerned, everyone—the President,
Congress, the lower courts, and plaintiffs—has played hard and fast
with the rules, taking advantage of the Court’s functionalist approaches to foreign affairs issues. The only response, the Justices
seem to be saying, is for the Court to dispense with its traditional foreign affairs functionalism and embrace a new brand of foreign affairs
formalism. Only clean lines, clear rules, and cabined roles can bring
foreign affairs back under control.
And over the past eight years, the Roberts Court has followed
this prescription aggressively, dipping its toes (or really doing the cannonball) into waters it usually avoids, distinguishing fifty-year-old decisions on the trial and detention of enemy combatants,463 upturning
decades old tests from the circuit courts on extraterritoriality464 and
the scope of the Alien Tort Statute,465 making a rare intervention to
correct (in its view) the scope of the political question doctrine,466 toying with limits on the ever-questioned but long-resilient holding of
Missouri v. Holland, and making its first foray in nearly two centuries
into the treaty self-execution doctrine, capsizing longstanding circuit
court tests in its wake.467 The broad, exclusive power over recognition, long claimed by Presidents and acquiesced to by Congress and
the courts, may be next.468
This shift to foreign affairs formalism is now too longstanding,
too widely applied, and too dramatic to ignore. The mood of the
Court has shifted, and with it so too must our gaze. The question is no
longer whether the Court is too willing to defer, but whether it is too
eager to intercede. At least until the pendulum swings again.
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464

See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)).
See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247

(2010)).
465

See supra Part II.B.4 (discussing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659

(2013)).
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See supra Part II.B.6 (discussing Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421

(2012)).
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See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008)).
See supra Part III.A. (discussing Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014)).

